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Abstract 
This paper challenges the prevailing view that investor sentiment is a contrarian predictor of 
market returns at nearly all horizons. As an important piece of "out-of-sample" evidence, we 
document that investor sentiment in China is a reliable momentum signal at monthly frequency. 
The strong momentum predictability is robust under both single- and multi-regressor settings, and 
is statistically and economically significant both in and out of sample, enhancing portfolio 
performance as shown by our numerical examples. More importantly, we find a striking term 
structure that local sentiment shifts from a short-term momentum predictor to a contrarian 
predictor in the long run. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that sentiment is more of a small-firm 
effect. Finally, we confirm that global sentiment spills over to the local Chinese market, as it 
predicts negatively future returns over the longer horizons and in the cross section. 
JEL classification: C22; C53; G11; G12; G17 
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“Studies of the sentiment of investors are important for two reasons. First, they teach us about 
biases in the stock market forecasts of investors. Second, they teach us about opportunities to 
earn extra returns by exploiting those biases.” 
—Kenneth L. Fisher and Meir Statman (2000) 
 
1. Introduction 
The effect of investor sentiment on asset prices has long been a debatable issue in financial 
economics. On the theoretical side, proponents of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) argue 
that the impact of sentiment is “at most” negligible, as rational investors ruthlessly arbitrage away 
any sentiment-induced mispricing. Theorists from the behavioral camp, however, contend that 
sentiment induces systematic deviations from fundamental values due to the well-known “limit to 
arbitrage” argument (De Long et al. 1990a). Besides, Brown and Cliff (2005) and Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) point out that sentiment tends to have a long-lasting effect, so that the demand 
shocks of uninformed investors (e.g. noise traders) may be correlated over time to give rise to 
strong and persistent mispricing. Intuitively, the impact of sentiment on returns should be 
stronger for markets with binding arbitrage constraints (Kling & Gao 2008) or that are more 
culturally collectivistic and highly prone to herding (Schmeling 2009). Still, whether investor 
sentiment matters for asset returns is an empirical issue.  
This article relates to the above classical, yet contestable topic by investigating thoroughly the 
return predictability of investor sentiment over multiple horizons in China, the largest and most 
liquid emerging stock market. Prior works on the predictive power of sentiment mainly focused 
on US and other developed markets (Brown & Cliff 2004, 2005; Baker & Wurgler 2006, 2007; 
Huang et al. 2014), and uniformly find that sentiment is a strong long-term contrarian predictor 
(Baker & Stein 2004; Brown & Cliff 2005; Baker et al. 2012).
1
 High sentiment is linked with low 
market returns in the long run, implying (possible) market revision over time. Moreover, the 
contrarian predictability is more pronounced in the cross section (Baker & Wurgler 2006; Baker 
et al. 2012). Baker and Wurgler (2007) attribute the contrarian predictability to the mean-
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 It should be noted that the strikingly large long-run predictability documented in the empirical literature is not 
without controversy. See Boudoukh et al. (2008) for the caveats in long-horizon regressions.   
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reverting pattern in sentiment. That is, sentiment wanes in the long run and market corrects the 
mispricing induced by sentiment.  
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on near-term return predictability, compared with the 
strong long-term predictability, is both thin and unclear. Using a wide range of sentiment proxies, 
including technical indicators and survey type data, Brown and Cliff (2004) find little, if any, 
evidence that sentiment forecasts returns at the weekly and monthly frequency in the US. Huang 
et al. (2014), however, find some statistical evidence that investor sentiment forecasts negatively 
future monthly returns with the aligned sentiment index, but not with the Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) sentiment index, which is more commonly used in empirical studies.  
The somewhat ambiguous empirical evidence on the short-term return predictability of investor 
sentiment motivates our study, as the widely perceived contrarian predictability of investor 
sentiment in the long run does not necessarily carry over to the short run. Moreover, compared 
with developed markets, emerging markets tend to have binding arbitrage constraints, pervasive 
local retail investors, and less openness to international (institutional) investors. Therefore, 
whether we could find a similar contrarian predictability pattern in alternative market settings 
remains an interesting, yet unanswered question. The Chinese stock market provides a natural 
experiment for such an “out-of-sample” test in the spirit of Lo and MacKinlay (1990). It is well-
known for its distinctive features from the US and other developed market. First, it is generally 
regarded as a highly speculative market dominated by the trading of individual investors. 
Individual investors (noise traders) have more market power in China than in developed markets. 
Second, it is highly restrictive because of its stringent institutional settings such as strong short-
sales constraints. The high short-selling costs also hinder institutional investors (rational investors) 
to engage in price stabilizing activities by trading against noise traders in China. All of these 
unique features, which are different from the US market (and other major developed markets), 
seem to tilt more towards the possibility that irrational sentiment leads to the expectation of 
increased future returns in the short term.  
It should be noted that a number of prior works have shed some light on the sentiment impact on 
China’s stock market. For example, Chi et al. (2012) use mutual fund flow as a sentiment proxy 
and find that high sentiment stocks earn high average returns compared with low sentiment 
stocks between 2004 and 2008. Kling and Gao (2008), however, document that a survey-based 
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institutional investor sentiment measure offers no return predictability at the daily frequency. 
Chen et al. (2014) construct a market-based Chinese sentiment index and find their sentiment 
index has good forecasting power for the market movements. However, their sentiment index 
contains both rational and irrational components, which makes it difficult to interpret the sources 
of the forecasting power. Alongside these prior works, our article contributes to the evolving 
literature on sentiment in a number of distinctive ways: 
First, we motivate a thorough discussion on the possible mechanisms through which the 
sentiment of investors might impact on subsequent returns. In particular, we emphasize the 
competing hypotheses regarding the short-run return predictability of sentiment. For emerging 
markets with pervasive irrational speculation (e.g. positive feedback trading) and binding 
arbitrage constraints (e.g. stronger short-sales constraints and less openness to international 
investors), the level of investor sentiment is very likely to forecast positively stock returns in the 
short run, while still predicting negatively the stock returns over longer horizons. Obviously, our 
perceived view challenges the conventional view that investor sentiment is a contrarian predictor 
at nearly all horizons, which is drawn almost exclusively from the evidence in the US and other 
developed markets. 
Second, we piece together a number of imperfect sentiment proxies and extract their common 
component to form a real-time market-based sentiment index, which spans a period of 17 years 
(1997-2013). Obviously, the much longer and more recent sample period guarantees that our 
analysis on the possible effect on China’s stock market is the most comprehensive and the most 
up-to-date. For example, Chi et al. (2012) use a sample which covers only from 2004 to 2008. 
The much larger sample size, compared with the prior studies, will undoubtedly increase the 
statistical power for the time-series regressions employed in the article.  
Third, we properly address the Stambaugh (1999) estimation bias inherent in the predictive 
regression with a persistent predicting variable, while this important econometric issue has often 
been overlooked in prior works such as in Chi et al. (2012). Our simulation evidence reveals that 
the ordinary least square (OLS) slope coefficient on sentiment tends to be downward biased 
towards the (spurious) finding of contrarian predictability. Therefore, we employ a number of 
refined econometric techniques, including bias-reduction in coefficients and wild bootstrap for 
test statistics, to provide compelling evidence that investor sentiment is indeed a reliable 
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momentum predictor for subsequent monthly market returns in China, confirming the momentum 
hypothesis. A one-standard-deviation increase in sentiment translates into a 1.50% rise in the 
equity premium per month, an economically significant result for all market participants. The 
strong positive return predictability is robust under both single-and multi-regressor settings, and 
is statistically and economically significant both in and out of sample.  
Fourth, the strong out-of-sample predictability at monthly frequency renders us to construct 
profitable investment strategies based on the strong forecasting power of investment sentiment. 
Our numerical example suggests that our sentiment-based signals enhance the portfolio 
performance, and outperform the naïve buy-and-hold portfolio. More importantly, the investor 
reaps much higher rewards on a risk adjusted basis, if he or she follows the trading signals 
generated by sentiment rather than past returns.  
Fifth, we investigate the term structure of the return predictability of investor sentiment in China. 
Evidence from multi-horizon predictive regressions yields a striking term pattern: Investor 
sentiment converts from a momentum predictor in the short run (e.g. within the first year) to a 
contrarian predictor in the subsequent, longer horizons (from two to five years). The fact that 
sentiment forecasts negatively market returns in the long run confirms the well-known contrarian 
predictability of sentiment, as the sentiment mean reverts over an unknowingly long horizon. We 
also examine the potential spillover effect of global sentiment on China’s stock market. In 
contrast to local sentiment, we find global sentiment does not have an immediate impact, but 
predicts returns negatively over much longer horizons.  
Last, but not least, we perform a batch of cross-sectional analyses. Using size-sorted portfolios as 
proxies for stocks with different sentiment sensitivity, we find that local investor sentiment is 
more of a size story (Lee et al. 1991): The short-term momentum pattern of sentiment matters 
more for small-cap stocks than for large-cap ones. In contrast, there seems less cross-sectional 
difference for the impact of global sentiment, as it uniformly predicts negatively long-run stock 
returns across the size groups.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 first introduces the Chinese stock market and 
then reviews the relevant literature and puts forth the competing testable hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the data sources, the construction of sentiment index, and descriptive statistics. Section 
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4 provides the main results of the return predictability over various horizons. Section 5 performs 
cross-sectional analyses. Section 6 discusses the implications of our findings and concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. The Introduction of the Chinese Stock Market  
There are two major security exchanges in mainland China: the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSZ) 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). The two exchanges have no functional difference, 
except that SHSZ is larger than SZSE in terms of market capitalization. At the end of 2013, both 
exchanges are ranked among the top 12 stock exchanges in the world based on the total value of 
market capitalization (see Table A.2 in the appendix). The combined market capitalization of 
SHSZ and SZSE is equivalent to 42% of China’s GDP in 2013. For historical reasons, common 
shares in the two exchanges are classified as A-shares and B-shares, which are denominated in 
local currency and foreign currencies (USD or Hong Kong dollar), respectively. As A-shares 
comprise the lion’s share (96%) of the market, we focus exclusively on the A-share market for 
our empirical analyses. 
Several distinctive features regarding the Chinese A-share market are worth mentioning: 
First and foremost, the Chinese market is well known for its speculative nature with a huge 
amount of young and inexperienced retail investors. According to the 2013 annual report of 
China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation, there are more than 53 million valid 
individual investor accounts in SHSE and SZSE, among which 44% of the account holders are 
less than 40 years old. Less than 20% of the retail investors have an education background of 
bachelor degree or above. A breakdown on the stock holdings and trading activities in SHSE 
(Panel B of Table A.2) provides more insights: Individual investors hold directly more than 21% 
of the total market capitalization of the stocks in SHSZ. In comparison, stock holdings by 
professional institutions—including investment funds, pension funds, security companies, 
insurance companies, asset under management (AUM) firms, and qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFII)—is less than 15% as of 2013. More strikingly, trading activities by individual 
investors account for 82.24% of the total trading volume in 2013.
2
 It is well known in the 
                                                 
2
 Unfortunately, we do not have the breakdown data for SZSE. However, there are no reasons to believe that 
individual investors play a lesser role in SZSE as compared with SHSE. In fact, the percentage of stocking holding 
and the composition of trading volume by individual investors is more likely to be higher for SZSE than SHSE, as 
individual investors tend to hold small and speculative stocks, which are mostly listed in SZSE. This is also 
supported by the much higher turnover ratio in SZSE than in SHSE (see the last column of Panel A in Table A.2).  
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financial literature that retail investors are highly influenced by sentiment. They hold less 
diversified portfolios, have more incentives to trade speculative stocks, and engage in 
unsophisticated trading strategies such as trend following or correlated trading (Feng & Seasholes 
2004; Kumar & Lee 2006).  
Second, as one of the leading emerging markets, the Chinese stock market is extremely liquid and 
has an unprecedented trading volume. As is shown in the last column of Panel A in Table A.2, 
on average, stocks in SHSE and SZSE are turned over at least 1.49 and 2.65 times in 2013, which 
is even higher than the average turnover ratio for many of the developed markets.  
Third, the Chinese stock market is characterized by heavy regulation: Short-sales of stocks are 
prohibited by law. The stringent constraints on short selling make it very difficult to arbitrage 
away the mispricing at the market level as well as the stock level (Mei et al. 2009).  
Fourth, the market has less openness to international investors. It only opens its door to foreign 
investors in November 2002. Only approved qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) can 
invest in the Chinese A-share market, and they are subject to a number of rules and regulations 
(e.g. capital control) imposed by the local regulatory body.  
Overall, given their large share holdings and frequent trading volume, retail investors (noise 
traders) have very strong market power in China’s stock market. These unique investor features, 
which are distinct from developed markets, seems to weigh more on the sentimental demand 
from the noise traders. It provides an interesting “out-of-sample” test for the sentiment effect on 
stock returns under alternative settings.  
2.2. Relevant Literature 
In recent years, a prevailing view in finance is that investor sentiment, defined as the irrational 
belief formed by a subset of uninformed investors (e.g. noise traders), is a contrarian indicator of 
future stock returns at nearly all horizons (Fisher & Statman 2000; Baker & Wurgler 2007): 
The contrarian hypothesis: The net effect of investor sentiment on subsequent returns is negative. 
The contrarian view— a high (low) level of sentiment is linked with low (high) market returns in 
the subsequent periods—is rationalized by the theoretical work of Barberis et al. (1998), in which 
the representative, sentiment-prone agent extrapolates the current trend far into the future (the 
representative bias), makes erroneous bets on future market movements by pushing prices far 
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away from the fundamental values, and eventually faces adverse consequences as “fads” do not 
live up to the facts (price revision).  
A similar view is noted in Warther (1995). He formulates the “price-pressure” hypothesis that 
unwarranted sentimental demand (via aggregated mutual fund flows), which reflects no real 
information, exerts contemporaneous price pressure and is linked with lower expected returns in 
subsequent periods (price reversals). De Long et al. (1990a) argue that sentiment-induced 
mispricing provides profitable opportunities for arbitrageurs to buck the trend, the so-called 
“arbitrage effect”, which also leads to a contrarian effect of investor sentiment on subsequent 
returns. Therefore, a negative relation between investor sentiment and subsequent market returns 
can be broadly perceived as indirect evidence that 1) noise traders systematically bet wrongly on 
the future direction of market movements, the “dumb money effect”, and 2) rational speculators 
engage in price-stabilizing activities (e.g. arbitrage) to bring the market prices back to 
fundamental levels, the “smart money effect”.  
Empirically, ample evidence on long-run time-series predictability is provided from the US 
market (Baker & Stein 2004; Brown & Cliff 2005) and other developed markets (Schmeling 
2009) to reassure the contrarian view. Moreover, the contrarian predictability of sentiment is 
more pronounced in the cross section (Baker & Wurgler 2006; Frazzini & Lamont 2008; Baker et 
al. 2012). 
Despite its wide popularity, powerful tests in the above sentiment-induced return reversal pattern 
are, however, inherently difficult as there are no firm guidelines as to the appropriate time frame 
to be used in these tests (Warther 1995). At one extreme, researchers look for the forecasting 
power of sentiment at really short horizons (e.g. weekly or monthly), as in Brown and Cliff 
(2004). At the other extreme, the return predictability of sentiment from one to five year horizons 
is also heavily investigated by empiricists (Brown & Cliff 2005; Schmeling 2009).   
The uncertainty about the appropriate time frame to test the relation between investor sentiment 
and future market returns, at the very least, points to the fact that the documented long-run 
contrarian predictability of investor sentiment does not necessarily carry over to the short 
horizons, such as weekly or monthly frequency. On the one hand, high levels of investor 
sentiment, which is unjustifiable by the facts, can pose a warning sign for stock returns in the 
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near term (a negative relation between sentiment and subsequent returns). On the other hand, the 
sentiment of investors is also likely to exert a persistent, positive effect on subsequent returns in 
the short run (a positive relation between sentiment and subsequent returns). A number of 
behavioral reasons or real-world mechanisms could contribute to such a positive mechanism 
between investor sentiment and future returns in the short run. Though the literature offers no 
fully specified model on the linkage between sentiment and short-term returns, a number of 
works give hints on the possible directions in which sentiment might impact on future returns in 
the short run, which we summarize in the next subsection on testable hypotheses. 
2.3. The Momentum Hypothesis 
The contrarian predictability of sentiment builds heavily on the efficiency of financial markets. 
That is, rational speculators (informed investors) stabilize the asset prices, bucking the trend 
induced by sentiment. It should be noted, however, that a number of real world mechanisms or 
frictions, which prevail in the financial markets, limit the arbitrage ability of rational speculators. 
As a result, mispricing could prevail for extended periods of time, and the level of sentiment 
could also serve as a momentum predictor for subsequent returns in the short run. This should not 
be surprising, as Kling and Gao (2008) find that investor sentiment follows a positive feedback 
process in the short run in China. Adding to this argument are the empirically observed year-long, 
self-feeding price bubbles in the history of Chinese stock market (e.g. the 2007 price bubble). We 
provide below a number of reasons for the alternative, momentum predictability of investor 
sentiment.  
First, arbitrage—the activity to bring mispriced assets back to their fundamental level—is limited 
in practice (Shleifer & Summers 1990). Unlike the theoretical assumption of an infinite horizon, 
rational speculators, such as institutional investors, typically have shorter investment horizons 
than noise traders (retail investors) in practice. The shorter horizon makes them concerned about 
the resale prices, in particular. The uncertainty due to noise trader risk suggests that betting 
against noise traders run the risk, at least in the short run, could incur huge financial losses if 
investor sentiment turns more extreme, and prices move further away from fundamental levels, 
the well known “create-space effect” (De Long et al. 1990a). Therefore, the concern about the 
resale price limits rational speculators’ ability to take on price stabilization activities (arbitrage) 
in the short run. Adding to the nerve of rational institutional investors are the fundamental risk of 
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the underlying (De Long et al. 1990a), the regular performance evaluation with their peers, and 
short-sales constraints (or the barrier of short-sales costs). All of these factors could contribute to 
the possibility that noise-trader-induced mispricing gets more pronounced over a protracted 
period of time, leading to a positive relation between investor sentiment and subsequent returns in 
the short turn.  
Second, Shleifer and Summers (1990) warn that one of the strongest behavioral tendencies is to 
extrapolate or chase the trend. Investment is a social process: Sentiment investors are reinforced 
by each other hopping on the bandwagon (the so called “bandwagon effect”). Put differently, 
noise traders herd in and out of the market to engage in the trend-following strategy, causing 
prices to deviate further from their fundamental level. More dramatically, the “bandwagon effect” 
could persist for extended periods of time, as sentiment gets higher and higher over time and 
sequential (new) investors flooded into the market, which leads to the phenomenal “deposit 
drawdown effect” in China as documented in Burdekin and Redfern (2009). Using a sequential 
decision model, Banerjee (1992) shows that it makes sense for subsequent investors to 
underweight their own information and overweight the information of existing market 
participants, thereby leading to the herd behavior. The herd behavior also implies a broad wave of 
trend-chasing activities which widens the sentiment-induced mispricing in subsequent periods. 
Therefore, the trend-chasing behavior postulates a positive effect of sentiment on future returns. 
A third reason is that even the rational speculators jump onto to the bandwagon and engage in 
price destabilizing activities, given the prevalence of the positive feedback traders (De Long et al. 
1990b). In anticipation of the future buying power of positive feedback traders as assumed in De 
Long et al. (1990b)’s model, rational speculators buys ahead of others to reap the profits in 
subsequent selling against positive feedback traders. The essence of the model is that informed 
rational speculators exploit the systematic bias of others who extrapolate trends far into the future 
by purchasing ahead of these positive feedback traders, pumping up the asset price, and 
triggering anticipated sentimental demand at many horizons. As long as positive feedback traders 
focus on sufficiently long investment horizons (based on their erroneous extrapolation), a series 
of positively correlated realized returns are expected in conjunction with their sentiment. 
Therefore, the implication of the model is consistent with a positive effect of sentiment on future 
returns. 
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Overall, the possibility that misperception about future market movements gets more pronounced 
over a protracted period of time suggests a momentum predictability of investor sentiment for 
subsequent returns, at least in the short-term. In other words, a high level of sentiment leads to 
high stock returns in subsequent periods.  
The momentum hypothesis: The net effect of investor sentiment on subsequent returns is 
positive. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Design 
3.1. Sample Periods and Market Return Proxies 
This paper employs a comprehensive dataset of the Chinese A-shares, carefully constructed from 
several reliable sources (see Table 1). The sample period spans 17 years from 1997 to 2013. To 
properly characterize the overall performance of the market, we follow Fama and French (1993, 
2012) and Frömmel and Han (2014) by calculating the total return (including dividends) of the 
market portfolio as the value-weighted average of all available individual stocks, which is free of 
survival bias. Following the convention, we use the monthly rate of the one-year bank term 
deposit in China as the risk-free rate. The excess market return is then the difference between the 
return of the market portfolio and the risk-free rate. Our proxy for the market excess returns 
covers both capital gains and dividend income, which is better than the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Composite Indices that are pure price indices.  
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
3.2. The Investor Sentiment Index 
To properly measure the aggregated market sentiment in China, we start by searching for a 
number of reliable individual sentiment proxies: namely, market turnover ratio (𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁), number 
of newly opened individual investor accounts in Shanghai Stock Exchange (𝐼𝐼𝐴), and value-
weighted price-earning ratio (𝑃𝐸) of the market. We are aware that there are no definitive or 
uncontroversial measures for market sentiment. In many cases, the sentiment proxies are country-
11 
 
specific and are subject to data availability.
3
 The inclusion of these individual sentiment measures 
in our study is mainly based on sound economic reasons, data consistency, and data availability. 
For example, market-wide turnover is considered as a direct measure of investor sentiment 
according to the theoretical justification in Baker and Stein (2004). A high market turnover ratio 
indicates high demand from the sentiment investors who push the rational investors out of the 
market, destabilizing asset prices. The number of newly opened investor accounts is also highly 
reflective of investor sentiment in China (Chen et al. 2014): Given the strong market power of 
retail investors in China, an increasing number of new accounts implies a larger (irrational) 
demand from retail investors. The inclusion of the price-earnings ratio follows the same logic of 
Indro (2004). As we do not have mutual fund flow data to estimate increased money flowing to 
the market, we use the valuation ratio as a direct proxy for the flow data. The logic is quite 
straightforward: As long as (more) money is pouring into the market, the valuation ratio will 
power higher. Historical episodes of dramatic price bubbles in China’s stock markets are 
uniformly linked with unreasonably high valuation ( 𝑃𝐸 ) events. In principle, all the three 
individual measures are good candidates for investor sentiment as they have greater values in bull 
markets and lower values in bear markets, reflecting a positive correlation with the investor mood. 
Moreover, these sentiment proxies are available for the entire sample period and have no artificial 
breaks in the time series. 
To properly form a valid market-based sentiment index in China, we then follow carefully a 
number of statistical procedures as summarized below.  
First, as noted in Baker and Wurgler (2007), individual sentiment proxies may have a 
deterministic trend which is not related to investor sentiment. For example, both turnover ratio 
and the number of newly opened individual investor accounts have an upward trend in our 
sample period, which reflects the unprecedented growth of China’s capital market and the 
increased market participation by retail investors over time. Therefore, we follow the detrend 
                                                 
3
 For example, Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) construct a US sentiment index based on six individual components: 
the close-end fund discount, the NYSE share turnover, the number of IPOs, the average first-day return of IPOs, the 
equity share in new issues, and the dividend premium. However, in a later international study, Baker et al. (2012) 
admit data limitations and could only construct the country-specific sentiment index with four components: the 
volatility premium, the volume of IPOs, the average first-day return of IPOs, and market turnover. Other scholars 
advocate the use of alternative measures for sentiment, such as technical indicators and/or survey-based measures 
(Brown & Cliff 2004, 2005; Lemmon & Portniaguina 2006; Schmeling 2007, 2009). 
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procedure as suggested in Baker and Wurgler (2007) and Chen et al. (2014) to scale individual 
sentiment proxies by their prior six-month moving average. The detrend procedure removes the 
(undesirable) deterministic trend and also helps to ensure the stationarity of the time series. 
Second, as is noted in prior literature that shifts in these sentiment proxies have both a rational 
component and an irrational one. The rational component relates to the changes in macro 
fundamental, as sentiment investors receives a noisy signal about the overall economy (Verma & 
Soydemir 2009). To remove, or at least alleviate, the “rational” effect, we follow Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) and Verma and Soydemir (2009)’s orthogonalization procedure by regressing 
each individual proxy on a set of macro variables (namely the growth of industrial production, 
growth of money supply, levels of short-term interest rates and foreign exchange rates). The 
residuals of the orthogonalization procedure are then the proxies for the irrational part of investor 
sentiment.  
Third, we adopt the principal component approach (PCA) of Baker and Wurgler (2007) by 
extracting the first principal component from the three individual sentiment measures (the 
residuals) as the market-based investor sentiment index.
4
 In principle, the first principal 
component, which captures the common variation of the individual measures, should represent 
properly the time variation of (unobserved) market-wide investor sentiment in China.  
The principal component procedure leads to the following sentiment index, denoted as 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐴.  
𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 = 0.570𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡
𝑂 + 0.642𝐼𝐼𝐴𝑡
𝑂 + 0.510𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝑂 [3.1] 
The first component explains 67% of the sample variance, well capturing the co-movement of 
individual sentiment proxies. We use the subscript O to denote that all the three components are 
orthogonalized to the macroeconomic variations, capturing the irrational sentiment effects. All 
three proxies have the expected sign, confirming the positive relation with market sentiment. The 
PCA sentiment index places the most importance on 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝑂 , as its coefficient is the largest in 
magnitude, reinforcing that the number of newly opened accounts gauges the irrational optimism 
among retail investors. For comparison purposes, we also construct a naïve sentiment index, 
denoted as 𝑆𝑁𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒, which imposes equal weights on the three sentiment composites, and another 
                                                 
4
 The PCA proceeds as follows: First, we standardize the three sentiment proxies and obtain the eigenvalue and 
eigenvector of their covariance matrix. Second, the composite sentiment index is constructed as a linear combination 
of the three variables using the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalues as the corresponding weight. 
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PCA sentiment index which excludes the less commonly used component 𝑃𝐸𝑂, denoted as 𝑆𝐸𝑥𝑃𝐸. 
In fact, these two alternative sentiment indices are highly correlated with the original PCA 
sentiment index, with correlation coefficients of 98% and 94%, respectively.   
Figure 1 plots the fluctuation of the PCA sentiment index together with the market excess returns 
in our sample periods. The most salient feature is that the sentiment index tracks closely the 
direction of market returns, implying a high correlation between the innovations of the two series. 
Moreover, a (preliminary) eye-ball test indicates the appropriateness of our sentiment index, as 
the peaks and troughs of the index are concurrent with the major episodes in China’s stock 
market history. For example, the spike in June 1999 is probably a response to the reduction of the 
stamp tax of security transaction within that month, while the spikes in May 2006 and January 
2007 are concurrent with the then-record daily transaction value of 55.3 billion and 100 billion 
Chinese yuan, respectively. The largest price crash (the post 2007 period) is also consistent with 
the consecutive pessimistic sentiment wave from October 2007 to October 2008.         
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the dataset. The arithmetic mean and standard 
deviation of the monthly market excess return are 0.16% and 8.07%, respectively, indicating a 
monthly Sharpe ratio of 0.02 and a market price risk (defined as the ratio of market excess return 
to its variance) at around 0.25. One important note is that the relatively low market price of risk, 
which reflects the implied risk aversion of an average investor, suggests that Chinese investors 
are generally less risk averse as compared with investors in developed markets.
5
 The high return 
volatility, low Sharpe ratio, and lower degree of risk aversion are, however, in line with the 
general perception of a speculative market as described in Section 2.1. The sentiment indices, the 
three individual sentiment components, and other economic variables are all standardized with 
mean zero and unit variance, which will facilitate the comparison of their economic significance 
in later predictive regression. Consistent with the literature, all the predicting variables seem quite 
persistent, indicated by their first-order autocorrelation coefficient. In contrast, the market excess 
return exhibits no serial correlation effect, as its first-order autocorrelation coefficient is virtually 
zero. The time-series plots of these economic and financial variables are available in Figure A.1 
in the appendix. 
                                                 
5
 The historical market price of risk in the United States is between 1.5 and 4 in Bodie et al. (2012).  
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The lower part of Table 2 presents the cross-correlation coefficients of the dataset. Several 
prominent features are worth noting. First, the market excess return is highly correlated with the 
PCA sentiment index and its three components. The positive contemporaneous correlation is 
consistent with Figure 1 that increased sentiment level will push up asset price and lead to 
increased return during the current period (the “price pressure”). It also reinforces the need to 
adopt a bias-reduction technique in our later estimation because the innovations of both sentiment 
and market return are highly correlated. Second, the three sentiment components are highly 
correlated with each other, reinforcing their validity as the proxies for market sentiment. The 
orthogonalized 𝑃𝐸 ratio has only a correlation coefficient of 0.26 with the unorthogonalized 𝑃𝐸 
ratio, much less than its correlation with 𝐼𝐼𝐴 sentiment proxy, which lends further support for its 
validity as a proxy for the (irrational) sentiment measure. Third, the consumer confidence index 
(CCI), a survey-based sentiment measure, is not correlated with contemporaneous returns. Nor 
does it directly correlate with all the market-based sentiment proxies as the coefficients are 
slightly negative, which further challenges its validity as a sentiment proxy in China. While some 
studies tend to use CCI as a proxy for investor sentiment (Schmeling 2009), we should point out 
that CCI concerns consumers’ general expectations about the overall prospects of the economy 
rather than the stock market. This is indeed the case, as CCI is positively correlated with other 
economic variables (such as BCI, IP, and PE ratio). We have more to say about CCI in our later 
analysis.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4. Time-series Analysis 
4.1. Short-term Return Predictability 
4.1.1. Single-factor Predictive Regression  
The predictive regression with a single predictor variable is by far the most heavily studied and 
commonly used in the literature. Hence, it forms the baseline model in establishing the relation 
between sentiment and market returns. 
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡+1  [4.1] 
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where 𝑅𝑡+1 is the market return in excess of the risk-free rate in period 𝑡 + 1, 𝑆𝑡 is the (lagged) 
sentiment proxy (or other predicting variable) measured at the end of period 𝑡. We test the null 
hypothesis (H0: 𝛽 = 0) that investor sentiment has no predictive ability by evaluating the slope 
coefficient.  
As our interest is to perform hypothesis testing on the slope coefficient in the predictive model, 
several econometric issues may well arise if we use the conventional OLS estimation procedures. 
First, there is potentially a spurious regression concern when the predictor is highly persistent 
(Ferson et al. 2003). Second, the OLS method produces biased coefficient in finite samples, the 
well-known Stambaugh (1999) small-sample bias, when the regressor is (highly) persistent and 
its innovations are correlated with those of the dependent variable. Note also that in our case the 
beta coefficient is downward biased (towards zero), as the innovations of the two time series are 
positively correlated. The magnitude of the potential downward bias in the OLS estimate is 
illustrated by the simulation evidence in Appendix A.  
To properly tackle the above mentioned econometric issues, we apply the multiple augmented 
regression method (mARM hereafter) of Amihud et al. (2009) to obtain the bias-reduced 
estimates of the slope coefficient on sentiment. We are aware that there are a number of 
alternative bias-reduction techniques proposed in the literature, such as the univariate augmented 
regression method (uARM hereafter) of Amihud and Hurvich (2004) and the moving-block 
jackknife method (MBJK hereafter) of Zhu (2013). Our choice of the mARM method is based on 
the good finite sample performance as indicated in the simulation evidence in Appendix A. 
The mARM method in Amihud et al. (2009) proceeds by running an auxiliary AR(1) regression 
on the predictor variable, 𝑆𝑡.
6
  
𝑆𝑡+1 = 𝜃
𝑐 + 𝜌𝑐𝑆𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡+1
𝑐   [4.2] 
where the superscript c denotes the bias-corrected estimates obtained by iterating on the Nicholls 
and Pope (1988) expression for the analytical bias of the OLS regression for the AR(1) process.
7
 
According to Amihud et al. (2009), the bias-reduced estimator of the slope coefficient 𝛽 in the 
                                                 
6
 Throughout the article, we use the term uARM and mARM to refer to the bias-reduction method in Amihud and 
Hurvich (2004) and Amihud et al. (2009), respectively. It should be noted that both methods are flexible enough to 
accommodate predictive regressions with single regressor and multiple regressors as well.   
7
 For brevity, we refer readers to Amihud et al. (2009) regarding the technical details on the iterative procedure. 
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predictive regression is achieved by augmenting Eq. [4.1] with the bias-corrected error term 𝑣𝑡+1
𝑐 , 
obtained from the auxiliary AR(1) regression in Eq. [4.2]. The statistical significance of the slope 
coefficient is based on the t-statistics associated with the Newey-West adjusted standard errors. 
For robustness of our hypothesis testing, we also report separately the empirical p-values based 
on the wild bootstrap procedure used in Huang et al. (2014). The wild bootstrap procedure takes 
into account the persistence in predictors, correlations between the innovations of market returns 
and those of predictors, and general forms of return distribution (e.g. heavy tails).
8
 In unreported 
analysis, we also perform the t-tests based on the adjusted standard errors according to the 
analytical expressions suggested in Amihud and Hurvich (2004) and Amihud et al. (2009). 
Results for the significance of the slope coefficients are very similar, and thus omitted for brevity 
purposes. 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the predictive regression. Panel A reports the baseline 
results using our PCA sentiment index, 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐴, constructed from the three individual sentiment 
components. Contrary to the prevailing view that sentiment is a contrarian predictor, we find that 
the PCA sentiment index is a momentum predictor over the entire sample period: Lagged 
sentiment is positively associated with the excess market return in the subsequent month with an 
OLS slope coefficient of 1.38%. The positive coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level 
based on the Newey-West t-statistics as well as the wild bootstrapped t-statistics (see the 
empirical p-value). When correcting for the finite sample bias using the mARM method, the 
slope coefficient becomes even larger in magnitude than the OLS estimator. The downward bias 
in OLS estimation is as expected, given that the forecast error in returns and innovations in 
investor sentiment are positively correlated (see also our simulation evidence in Appendix A). 
The bias-adjusted slope coefficient is around 1.50% under Amihud et al. (2009)’s mARM 
method. That is, a one-standard-deviation rise (drop) in sentiment increases (reduces) expected 
market returns over the next month by approximately 1.50%. Recall (from Table 2) that the 
sample average of the monthly excess market return in China is only 0.16%, thus the magnitude 
of the slope coefficient implies that the expected excess market return varies by about nine times 
larger than its average level, signaling strong economic significance. It seems tempting to 
extrapolate this return predictability to an annual basis by a multiplication factor of 12, which 
                                                 
8
 A walk-through of the wild bootstrap method is detailed in the appendix of Huang et al. (2014).  
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indicates an annualized value of around 18%. This, however, seems unreasonable because 
sentiment is mean-reverting and A high (low) sentiment level indicates lower return in the long 
run, which we will analyze further in Section 4.2.    
The R
2
 of the OLS regression for the entire sample period is around 2.95%. Empirically, this is 
comparable with, or slighter higher than, that of conventional return predictors at short horizons 
(Goyal & Welch 2008), where the typical explanatory power of a return predictor ranges between 
0.3% and 5% at the monthly frequency. The R
2
 of the mARM regression increases substantially 
as expected because the model includes the innovations from the auxiliary regression in Eq. [4.2], 
a contemporaneous term, which significantly increases the explanatory power of the variation in 
stock returns.  
To check whether the predicting power of sentiment is stable over time, we divide the full sample 
into two subsamples with more or less equivalent length: One spans from 1997 to 2005 and the 
other spans from 2006 to 2013. The positive return predictability of sentiment remains 
statistically significant in both cases, indicating a very stable predictive pattern at the monthly 
frequency. Interestingly, the magnitude of the slope coefficient seems more pronounced in the 
second subsample (2006-2013) than the first subsample (1997-2005). The enlarged sentiment 
effect over time is in line with the fact that the second subsample is characterized by more 
dramatic market shifts (e.g. the 2006-2007 price bubble and the 2007-2008 financial crisis).  
Panel B reports the estimation results using each of the individual sentiment components as the 
regressor. The results are highly consistent with that of the PCA sentiment index: The slope 
coefficients of 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂, 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝑂, and 𝑃𝐸𝑂 all have the expected positive sign and are all statistically 
significant, as demonstrated by the empirical p-values. The magnitude of the bias-reduced slope 
coefficients ranges between 0.91% and 1.77% on a monthly basis, again signaling strong 
economic significance. The R
2
s of the OLS predictive regression range from 1.10% to 3.64%. It 
seems clear that the forecasting power of our constructed PCA sentiment index comes directly 
from the three underlying components. Although each individual component can be used as a 
valid sentiment proxy and produces significant output, we weigh more on our constructed PCA 
sentiment index, as the PCA procedure removes the idiosyncratic noises contained in the 
individual proxies, if any (Baker & Wurgler 2006, 2007).  
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For comparison, we report in Panel C the estimation results for the three alternative sentiment 
indices. First, the equally weighted naïve sentiment index, 𝑆𝑁𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒 , has similarly strong 
forecasting power as our PCA sentiment index. The bias-reduced slope coefficient is 1.53% 
during the entire sample period. Second, recall from Panel B, it seems that 𝑃𝐸𝑂 is a stronger 
predictor than the other two conventional sentiment proxies. To address the suspicion that our 
baseline result is mainly driven by one single predictor, we construct the 𝑆𝐸𝑥𝑃𝐸  index, which 
includes only 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂  and 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝑂 . Not surprisingly, the 𝑆𝐸𝑥𝑃𝐸  index has very similar predictive 
features as the 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐴 index, although the slope coefficient and the R2 of the OLS regression is a bit 
smaller in magnitude: The bias-adjusted coefficient is 1.12%, which is significant at the 5% level, 
and the R
2
 of the OLS regression is 1.70%. The similar predictability from the 𝑆𝐸𝑥𝑃𝐸  index 
demonstrates the robustness of our baseline results, as they are not driven by the inclusion of a 
single sentiment proxy. Finally, the estimation results for the survey-based sentiment measure, 
CCI, is disappointing as its slope coefficient is virtually zero under both the OLS and mARM 
methods, indicating no return predictability at all. The inability to forecast returns in combination 
with its low correlation with all other (market-based) sentiment proxies (as shown in Table 2) 
poses challenges for the validity of CCI as a sentiment measure. In fact, CCI might be a poor 
measure for investor sentiment for a number of reasons. First, by definition, CCI measures 
consumers’ general expectations about the overall prospects of the economy rather than the stock 
market. Second and more critically, as a survey-based measure, there is always the concern of 
“what they say is not what they act”, meaning that the survey respondents do not really act in the 
way they indicated in the survey. Another concern is that CCI might reflect a rational expectation, 
rather than the irrational belief of sentiment investors. Therefore, all of these facts cast doubt on 
CCI as a valid sentiment proxy in our application.  
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
4.1.2. Multi-factor Predictive Regression  
We note that some criticism might arise that the predictive power of investor sentiment is mainly 
a manifestation of the shifts in fundamentals driven by business or economic cycles. To alleviate 
this concern, we first employ several macroeconomic variables, including business cycle 
indicator (BCI), industrial production (IP), and aggregated (value-weighted) PE ratio, as valid 
proxies for the economic fundamentals. We then examine whether the return predictability of 
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sentiment is robust after controlling for these fundamental effects with multivariate predictive 
regressions. Following the convention in the literature, we conduct the following multiple-factor 
predictive regressions based on the sentiment index, 𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴, and a vector of the control variables, 
𝑍𝑡.  
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 + 𝜓′𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1  [4.3] 
Again, our interest is in the slope coefficient, 𝛽 , which measures the marginal effect of the 
(lagged) sentiment level on subsequent market returns, after accounting for the effects of control 
variable(s).  
The first three model specifications in Table 4 report the bias-adjusted mARM estimation results 
based on bivariate predictive regression, in which we include the PCA sentiment index and one 
of the economic variables each at a time. Across the three model specifications, the slope 
coefficient 𝛽  on our sentiment index is very robust, as it has the same positive sign and its 
magnitude is more or less similar in all three cases, ranging from 1.34% to 1.52%, a result highly 
similar to that in the univariate regression. The uniform results in the bivariate regression confirm 
that the return predictability of sentiment is not purely due to the shifts in fundamentals (e.g. 
business cycles, industrial expansion, and market valuation effects).  
The last row of Table 4 reports the result for the so-called Kitchen Sink model, in which we 
include sentiment and the three economic variables all together. The advantage of the Kitchen 
Sink model is that it could increase the explanatory power of the predictive regression. However, 
the downside is that the heavily parameterized model with potentially highly correlated 
regressors might suffer from over-parameterization problem. Again, we find a very similar and 
consistent pattern: The bias-adjusted slope coefficient on 𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 is significantly positive and large 
in magnitude (1.39%), which is very similar to the case of the single-predictor regression in 
Table 3. The slope coefficients on IP and PE seem also significant with the Newey-West t-
statistics. However, when checking the empirical p-values generated from the wild-bootstrap 
testing procedure, only the slope coefficient on 𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 is statistically significant. To sum up, the 
incremental predictive effect of 𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴  are very robust, as it remains both statistically and 
economically significant after controlling for macro fundamentals under all four model 
specifications.  
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.1.3 Out-of-sample Predictability 
In this subsection, we address the well-known Goyal and Welch (2008)’s challenge, a legitimate 
concern that whether the strong monthly return predictability documented in the in-sample 
analysis will be carried over to the out-of-sample period. In principle, an over-fitted predictive 
model tend to deliver better in-sample forecasting performance, while such return predictability is 
not sustained out of sample. Therefore, the out-of-sample test is the most relevant for assessing 
genuine return predictability in real time as it avoids the over-parameterization issue (Goyal & 
Welch 2008).
9
 A somewhat related aim of the out-of-sample analysis is also to assess whether 
bias-reduction techniques such as mARM, uARM, and MBJK are able to provide enhanced 
forecasting performance out of sample.  
For the out-of-sample analysis we retain an in-sample period from 1997 to 2006 to parameterize 
our model, and use the remaining seven-year out-of-sample period to evaluate the forecasting 
performance. In general, there is a trade-off between having sufficient in-sample observations for 
a reliable estimation of model parameters and resuming a relatively long out-of-sample period for 
forecasting evaluation. Given the relatively short history of China’s stock market which 
unfortunately limits the sample size, our choice of the out-of-sample period well balances the 
above-mentioned trade-off. Furthermore, we adopt a recursive estimation scheme for the in-
sample model estimation and form the out-of-sample forecast for period 𝑡 + 1 with the following 
single-factor predictive model:  
𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) = ?̂?𝑡
𝑚 + ?̂?𝑡
𝑚𝑆𝑡  [4.4] 
where ?̂?𝑡
𝑚 and ?̂?𝑡
𝑚 are the regression coefficients estimated recursively using data from period 1 
to period 𝑡. The superscript m denotes the alternative estimation methods to obtain the fitted 
values, 𝑚 ∈ {𝑂𝐿𝑆, 𝑚𝐴𝑅𝑀, 𝑢𝐴𝑅𝑀, 𝑀𝐵𝐽𝐾}. 𝑆𝑡 denotes the predictor variable measured at the end 
of period 𝑡. To avoid the forward-looking bias in the original PCA sentiment index which is 
constructed from the entire sample, the PCA sentiment index used in Eq. [4.4] is also estimated 
                                                 
9
 According to Huang et al. (2014), out-of-sample tests also suffers less from small-sample size distortions such as 
the Stambaugh (1999) bias. 
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recursively each time using real-time information up to period 𝑡. Note that the forecasting model 
can also be augmented to include other predictor variables.
10
   
To take up the challenge from Goyal and Welch (2008), we compare the out-of-sample forecasts 
from the predictive model in Eq. [4.4] with the historical average as the benchmark. The 
historical average forecast corresponds to a constant return model, a nested version of the 
predictive model in Eq. [4.4] with the slope coefficient set as zero. Intuitively, if the underlying 
return process is generated by a constant plus a random noise, the predictive model in Eq. [4.4] 
produces a noisier forecast than the historical average because it estimates the slope coefficient 
with zero population values. In other words, we would expect the benchmark model to generate a 
smaller (or equivalent) mean squared forecast error (MSFE) than our predictive model. To 
properly evaluate this assertion, we calculate the widely used out-of-sample 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  statistic, the 
Diebold and Mariano (1995) t-statistic, and the Clark and West (2007) MSFE-adjusted statistic.  
The 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  statistic measures the proportional reduction in MSFE for the predictive regression 
forecast relative to the historical average benchmark (Campbell & Thompson 2008). It is 
computed as follows.   
𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 = 1 −
∑ (𝑅𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1))
2𝑇−1
𝑡=𝑝
∑ (𝑅𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑡+1)2
𝑇−1
𝑡=𝑝
 [4.5] 
where 𝑅𝑡+1 denotes the realized excess market return in period 𝑡 + 1, 𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) the forecast from 
the predictive model at the end of period 𝑡. The length of the in-sample period is denoted as p, 
while T is the total number of observations.  ?̅?𝑡+1 is the historical average (benchmark) at the end 
of period 𝑡 calculated as in Eq. [4.6].   
?̅?𝑡+1 =
1
𝑡
∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 [4.6] 
By construction, the 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  statistic lies within the range (−∞, 1]. A positive value of 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  indicates 
that the forecast 𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) outperforms the benchmark ?̅?𝑡+1 in terms of MSFE. 
                                                 
10
 The model specification for the augmented predictive model will be as follows: 𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) = ?̂?𝑡
𝑚 + ?̂?𝑡
𝑚𝑆𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡
𝑚′𝑍𝑡, 
where 𝑍𝑡 is the vector of other predictor variables.  
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The Diebold and Mariano (1995) test (DM-test hereafter) evaluates whether two forecasts offer 
the same forecasting accuracy. In this case, we test the null hypothesis that the historical average 
has a smaller or equivalent MSFE than that of the predictive regression model.  
In a similar vein, the MSFE-adjusted statistic due to Clark and West (2007), also evaluates the 
null hypothesis that forecast error (measured by MSFE) for the historical average is less than or 
equal to that produced by the predictive regression model.  
Panel A of Table 5 reports the out-of-sample forecast performance of sentiment using Eq. [4.4]. 
In the case of the PCA sentiment index, the OLS forecast model generates a positive 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  statistic 
of 3.45%, indicating a smaller MSFE than the historical average. The values of the 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  become 
even more positive, indicating more precise forecasting performance (smaller MSFE) under the 
two alternative bias-reduction techniques, the mARM and uARM methods, than their OLS 
counterparts. In terms of the statistical significance of the outperformance, the DM-test statistic is 
not significant, but the CW-test statistics are all significant at the 10% level for the four 
competing forecasts using OLS or bias-reduction techniques (mARM, uARM, and MBJK).  
For comparison purposes, we also generate a (recursive) naïve sentiment index, which imposes 
equal weights on the three composites to form the sentiment index. We find a very similar pattern 
for the naïve sentiment index, as the predictive model delivers better forecasts than the historical 
average, revealed by the positive 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  values of 3.54%. The forecasts using mARM and uARM 
bias-reduction techniques are also better than the OLS counterpart. Similar to the findings in the 
PCA sentiment index, the CW-test statistics are all significant at the 10% level for the four 
competing forecasts using OLS or bias-reduction techniques (mARM, uARM, and MBJK).  
Panel B of Table 5 reports the forecasting performance of bivariate predictive regressions with 
one predictor being fixed as the PCA sentiment index, while the other is the BCI, IP, or PE one at 
a time. The idea to augment the forecast model with additional predictor(s) is to exploit a 
(potentially) larger price-related information set. The downside, however, is that including non-
relevant variable(s) might increase noise in the model estimation and leads to worse forecasting 
performance. For all three bivariate forecasting models, we find very similar out-of-sample 
performance: The 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  values are positive, indicating superiority over the historical benchmark. 
However, a closer examination reveals that none of the 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  values are more positive than their 
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counterparts in the univariate case with sentiment index as the sole predictor. The forecasting 
errors (MSFE) are also larger than their counterparts in the univariate case and the DM-test and 
CW-test statistics also seem less significant in most situations. The weaker performance is 
possibly because the economic variables (BCI, IP, and PE) have very little or no predictive power 
for subsequent market returns, and the inclusion of them only adds additional noise to the out-of-
sample forecast.
11
  
Summarizing the findings in Table 5, we find strong evidence that investor sentiment predicts 
subsequent market returns out of sample. In many cases, the out-of-sample forecasting ability can 
be further improved by bias-reduction techniques, in particular the mARM methods, which is 
also consistent with findings in prior subsections.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.1.4 Portfolio Implications: Market Timing Strategies  
To shed lights on its portfolio implications, we propose a simple, modified market timing strategy, 
which shifts between the risky and risk-free assets based on the received trading signals. The 
design of the strategy is consistent with the short-sales constraints in China: At the end of each 
month, the investor will take a long position of the market portfolio over the next month, if he or 
she receives a buy signal. Otherwise the investor will liquidate the market portfolio and use the 
proceeds to invest in the risk-free asset. For comparison, we adopt three different sets of trading 
signals for the market timing exercise: The first set is based on lagged sentiment. When the 
lagged value of the sentiment index is above zero, it is defined as a buy signal. The intuition 
behind this is that whenever the market sentiment is above average, we expect the subsequent 
stock return will increase and thus take a long position in the equity market. The second set is 
based on the predicted value of the market excess return, generated by the forecasting model with 
sentiment as the predictor. If the expected market excess return is positive, it is then considered 
as a buy signal. The last set is the long-only version of the time-series momentum strategy in 
Moskowitz et al. (2012), denoted as TSMOM: A buy signal emerges when the cumulative returns 
over the prior 12 months (excluding the most recent month) is positive. Following the convention, 
                                                 
11
 In unreported analysis, we also consider the return forecasts from the Kitchen Sink model in Table 4 (the 
multivariate case); the out-of-sample performance is even worse than the bivariate cases and are thus omitted for 
brevity purpose. 
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we use the buy-and-hold strategy as the benchmark to evaluate the economic gain from the 
different sets of trading signals. As there is no particular reason to restrict the holding period to 
be one month, we also vary the holding period from one month up to 12 months. We use the 
methodology of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) with active portfolios to derive the single time 
series of the monthly returns for all holding periods larger than one month. Again, the out-of-
sample evaluation period is from January 2007 to December 2013. The excess return of the 
timing strategy is, therefore, calculated as follows: 
𝑅𝑡+1:𝑡+ℎ
𝑃 = 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡 × 𝑅𝑡+1:𝑡+ℎ [4.7] 
where 𝑅𝑡+1:𝑡+ℎ is the realized excess return of the market portfolio in the holding period (from 
month 𝑡 + 1 to 𝑡 + ℎ, and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡 is the trading signal received at the end of month 𝑡. 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡 
equals one when it is a buy signal, and zero otherwise.  
Panel A and B of Table 6 report the mean returns and Sharpe ratios, respectively, for the 
benchmark buy-and-hold strategy and the timing strategies based on various signals. A number of 
observations are in order. First, the benchmark buy-and-hold strategy incurs a loss during the 
entire evaluation period: The annualized mean excess return is -1.40% and its associated Sharpe 
ratio is -0.04. This, however, is not surprising, given that the evaluation period encompasses the 
recent global financial crisis when the Chinese equity market melted down as well.  
Second, the market timing strategy based on the signal of the lagged sentiment (the 2nd row) has 
a remarkable 10.75% excess return per annum for the one-month holding period, and its 
associated Sharpe ratio is 0.52, which is far better than the buy-and-hold strategy. Looking across 
the different holding periods, there are further improvements in the portfolio performances (i.e. 
excess return and Sharpe ratio) when the holding period varies from two to five months. 
Similarly, the strategy based on the forecasted excess returns generated by the sentiment model 
(the next four rows) also deliver great performance as the average excess return for the one-
month holding period ranges between 4.75% and 5.95% per year. Looking across the different 
holding periods, it seems optimal to set holding periods between two to four months as the 
Sharpe ratios are generally better within these holding periods.  
Third, in comparison, the long-only version of the time-series momentum strategy in Moskowitz 
et al. (2012) has only a moderate excess return of 0.11% per year, though it is still better than the 
25 
 
benchmark buy-and-hold strategy. The TSMOM strategy does improve to 3.12% when the 
holding period is two months, but in general, its performance is far worse than that based on the 
sentiment signals or the sentiment-based return signals. The underperformance of the TSMOM 
strategy in the out-of-sample exercise is, however, in line with the recent evidence in the 
literature: First, Georgopoulou and Wang (2016) find that the TSMOM strategy breaks down 
during the recent crisis period across a number of developed and emerging markets. Second, Kim 
et al. (2016) find that the TSMOM profit mainly stems from the risk parity approach (volatility 
scheme) adopted in Moskowitz et al. (2012)’s paper. After accounting for the volatility scheme, 
they conclude that the performance of the TSMOM strategy is indistinguishable from that of the 
buy-and-hold strategy.  
The fact that our sentiment-based market timing strategy outperforms the TSMOM strategy 
during the evaluation period reinforces the superiority of using investor sentiment to predict 
market returns. That is, lagged investor sentiment is a much stronger return predictor than lagged 
returns. After all, past returns are a noisy signal for future market movements (Levine & Pedersen 
2016). More importantly, it also leads to another point: The information content extracted from 
the sentiment signal is not subsumed by the dynamics of lagged returns, as the TSMOM strategy 
relying on the autocorrelation in returns is challenged in the crisis periods (Moskowitz et al. 2012; 
Georgopoulou & Wang 2016).   
Panel C of Table 6 provides more insights into the risk-adjusted performance of the market 
timing strategy by estimating the augmented Fama-French four-factor model. For brevity, we 
report only the results of the pooled regression for the timing strategy based on the lagged 
sentiment value and the TSMOM strategy, respectively. As it stands, the timing strategy with 
lagged sentiment earns a risk-adjusted return of 0.85% per month, which is significant at the 5% 
level. Moreover, the strategy loads positively on the market factor and the value factor at the 1% 
and 10% significance levels, respectively. Interestingly, the coefficient on the momentum factor 
is negative, which provides additional evidence that the “sentiment” impact is not mainly driven 
by past return dynamics.  
In comparison, the TSMOM strategy earns a risk-adjusted return of 0.40%, which is not 
statistically significant. The strategy loads significantly on the market, value, and momentum 
factors. The positive loadings on the momentum factor is consistent with the earlier findings that 
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the returns of the cross-sectional and time-series momentum strategies are highly positively 
correlated (Moskowitz et al. 2012).      
Summing up the results in Table 6, we find consistent evidence that investor sentiment is a 
strong momentum signal at the monthly frequency and its forecasting power can be translated 
into significant economic gains when implementing the market timing strategy based on the 
sentiment-related trading signals. In Appendix B, we provide additional evidence using the 
conventional asset allocation exercise for a mean-variance investor (DeMiguel et al. 2009), 
which further supports the finding that the improved forecasting ability with investor sentiment 
can translate into economically relevant gains for a mean-variance investor.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4.2. Long-term Return Predictability 
4.2.1 Long-horizon Predictive Regression 
In this subsection, we shift our focus to the long-run forecasting power of investor sentiment. So 
far, the empirical literature has produced strong evidence that market sentiment is a contrarian 
return predictor in the long run (Baker & Stein 2004; Brown & Cliff 2005; Baker et al. 2012). 
This strand of literature usually adopts the following multi-horizon predictive regression  
𝑅𝑡+1:𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡+1:𝑡+ℎ  [4.8] 
where 𝑅𝑡+1:𝑡+ℎ is the excess return cumulated (or averaged) over the period 𝑡 + 1 to 𝑡 + ℎ, 𝑆𝑡 is 
the ℎ-period lagged predictor (e.g. sentiment proxy) measured at the end of period 𝑡. The null 
hypothesis for testing (H0: 𝛽 = 0) is that the predictor has no predictive ability.  
For example, Huang et al. (2014) find that investor sentiment predicts negatively future market 
returns from one month up to 12 months. They attribute the empirical pattern of long-run 
sentiment effect to the classical behavioral argument of limit-of-arbitrage. In the long run, market 
gradually corrects mispricing as it cannot eliminate mispricing in a short period of time. Similarly, 
Schmeling (2009) provides international evidence across 18 advanced economies that investor 
sentiment is a contrarian predictor at one-, six-, 12-, and 24-month horizon.  
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Despite the growing evidence of the long-run contrarian predictability of sentiment in the 
financial markets, the above estimation method and its associated results, however, are not 
without substantial debates (Boudoukh et al. 2008). To overcome the problematic issues of using 
overlapping returns as the dependent variable and the level of persistence of predictive variable, 
we opt for an alternative route to investigate the term structure of return predictability for investor 
sentiment. To be specific, we consider the following predictive regression for return horizons 
range from one month to 60 months.
12
 
𝑅𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑡 + 𝜓
′𝑍𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡+ℎ  [4.9] 
where 𝑅𝑡+ℎ is the market excess return in the period 𝑡 + ℎ, 𝑆𝑡 is the ℎ-period lagged predictor 
(sentiment proxy) measured at the end of period 𝑡. We also include a vector of conventional 
macro variables to control for the shifts in fundamentals. The additional control variables are 
business cycle indicator (BCI), industrial production (IP), and aggregated PE ratio similar to 
subsection 4.1.2. Again, we test the null hypothesis (H0: 𝛽 = 0) that investor sentiment has no 
predictive ability by evaluating the slope coefficient. For robustness, we also test an alternative 
model specification based on the sign of the lagged sentiment, and present the results in 
Appendix C.   
Figure 2 plots the t-statistics from the predictive regressions across different time horizons (one 
to 60 months), using the PCA sentiment index as the return predictor. For robustness, we report 
the estimation results under alternative estimation techniques (OLS, mARM, uARM, and MBJK). 
A careful investigation of the four plots reveals the following patterns. First, market sentiment is 
a strong momentum signal in the short run (e.g. the first year). The t-statistics for the first eight 
consecutive months are all positive, with three out of them are significant at the 5% level. The 
momentum trend is the most pronounced at the one-, two-, and seven-month lag. Second, 
immediately following the short-term momentum pattern, t-statistics turn negative and become 
more significant over the subsequent months (i.e. from the ninth month to the 21st month). The 
change in the sign of the slope coefficients indicates that sentiment reverts to being a contrarian 
predictor over the subsequent periods. Moreover, starting from the ninth month till the 60th 
month, we find that the majority of the t-statistics (36 out of 52) are negative, indicating market 
sentiment predicts negatively market returns in the long run. In particular, the t-statistics at the 
                                                 
12
 We are highly indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting this estimation model over the problematic long-
run predictive model in Equation [4.8].   
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long end of the term structure (from the 47th month to the 60th month) are all negative, with six 
out of them are significant at the 10% level, reinforcing the notion expressed in Baker and 
Wurgler (2007) that the contrarian predictability of sentiment is linked with market revisions over 
time.  
In unreported robustness checks, we also test the multi-horizon predictive pattern of each of the 
three sentiment components (𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡
𝑂, 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝑡
𝑂, and 𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝑂) separately. Again we find very similar 
pattern that the sentiment proxy shifts from a short-term momentum predictor to a long-term 
contrarian predictor. In fact, for certain sentiment proxy (such as 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡
𝑂 ), the short-term 
momentum patterns last for even longer horizons than eight consecutive months as for the PCA 
sentiment index.  
To sum up, we find a very striking and robust term structure with different sentiment proxies and 
under alternative estimation methods. That is, investor sentiment shifts from a momentum 
predictor mainly within the first year to a contrarian predictor in the relatively longer horizons 
(approximately from the second year onwards), which is consistent with the short-term 
momentum hypothesis and the long-term contrarian hypotheses developed in Section 2.  
4.2.2 Impact of Global Sentiment 
In this subsection, we take a further step by investigating the (possible) contagious effect of 
global sentiment on China’s local stock market. Prior literature suggests that sentiment spreads 
across markets, as country-level sentiments are positively correlated with each other (Baker et al. 
2012). Using a panel regression in which they regress the monthly country-level returns on the 
beginning-of-year global and local sentiment, Baker et al. (2012) find strong evidence that global 
sentiment is a contrarian predictor of country-level returns.
13
 However, the time-series effect of 
local sentiment becomes trivial after controlling for the spillover from global sentiment.  
It should be noted that emerging markets typically are less open to the global financial markets 
than developed markets. For example, only qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) are 
able to invest in the Chinese A-share market, and they are subjected to capital controls by the 
local regulator body. The restriction on the market participation of international investors 
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 In Baker et al. (2012) the global sentiment is formed by extracting the common component from the six country-
level sentiment indices using the principle component method.  
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weakens the link between local sentiment and global sentiment. Accordingly, our market-based 
sentiment index has a slightly negative correlation of -13.5% with the US sentiment index during 
our sample periods (see Figure 3). Therefore, prior evidence on global sentiment from the 
advanced economies might be misleading for the emerging markets. Whether and how global 
sentiment spills over to the Chinese local market remains an interesting, unexplored empirical 
question. To establish the link between China’s stock returns and global sentiment, we estimate 
the following augmented long-horizon predictive models.  
𝑅𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 + 𝜓′𝑍𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡+ℎ  [4.10] 
where 𝑅𝑡+ℎ is the monthly market excess return over the period t+h, 𝑆𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 is the (lagged) local 
sentiment measured at the end of period 𝑡. For our analysis, we use again the PCA sentiment 
index. For the (lagged) global sentiment index, 𝑆𝑡
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙, we use the Baker and Wurgler (2007) US 
sentiment index as a valid proxy.
14
 Unfortunately, the US sentiment index ends at the end of 2010, 
which shortens the sample size for our analysis. Both sentiment indices are re-standardized to 
have zero mean and unit variance during the estimation period to facilitate the interpretation of 
the economic relevance. Again, we test whether the slope coefficients on these sentiment indices 
are statistically different from zero.  
Figures 4 and 5 plot the t-statistics for the local and global sentiment indexes from the multi-
horizon predictive regression using the OLS and mARM estimation methods, respectively.  The 
empirical patterns are very similar under the two estimation methods. First, the multi-horizon 
predictive pattern for the local PCA sentiment index remains virtually intact as compared with 
the pattern in Figure 2: It serves as a strong momentum predictor in the short run and gradually 
turns to a contrarian signal in the long run. Second, and more interestingly, we find that global 
sentiment does have a substantial impact on China’s stock market. However, the impact from 
global sentiment is not immediate, as none of the slope coefficients on 𝑆𝑡
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 are significant at 
the 5% level during the first two years. After approximately two years, global sentiment does 
seem to be a warning sign for the local stock market. The dramatic negative impact from the 
global sentiment is mostly concentrated between three- and four-year horizons. It should also be 
                                                 
14
 According to Baker et al. (2012), the US sentiment index contributes the most to the contagion of global sentiment. 
It should be noted that we do not perform a linear regression to generate a local sentiment index which is orthogonal 
to the global sentiment index, simply because multicolinearity is not a big concern here as China’s local sentiment 
has very little correlation with the US sentiment.  
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noted that the inclusion of the global sentiment also increase the explanatory power of the model 
as revealed by the increased R
2
 values compared with their univariate counterparts (unreported). 
Overall, we confirm the findings in Baker et al. (2012) that sentiment spreads across markets and 
global sentiment is a contrarian predictor for country-level returns in the long run.  
 
5. Cross-sectional Analysis 
5.1. Size-sorted Portfolios 
Although our main focus of the paper is on the aggregated market level, we also shed some light 
on the sentiment impact in the cross section during our sample period. Lee et al. (1991) contend 
that investor sentiment is more of a size story: Small firms are influenced more than large firms, 
which is later confirmed by other studies (Baker & Wurgler 2006, 2007; Baker et al. 2012; 
Stambaugh et al. 2012).  
Given the strong market power of retail investors in China, it makes sense to use market 
capitalization as a valid proxy for sentiment sensitivity, and to test the forecasting power of 
investor sentiment in the cross section. Accordingly, we sort stocks into large-, medium-, and 
small-cap portfolios based on empirical breakpoints of market capitalization at the 30th and 70th 
percentiles. That is, large-cap stocks represent sentiment immune stocks, while small-cap stocks 
represent sentiment-prone stocks. We should point out that if sentiment does impact more on 
small firms than large ones, we would expect to find that the short-term momentum signal is 
more pronounced for small firms, as those are the firms subject more to irrational sentiment, 
making it more difficult to arbitrage away sentiment-induced mispricing. 
To establish the cross sectional effect of sentiment, we adopt the same predictive regression 
framework as in Equation [4.9], except that the dependent variables are replaced by the monthly 
excess return series of the three size-sorted portfolios and the return of a zero-cost portfolio, in 
which we go long the small-cap and short the big-cap portfolio. Again, we test the null 
hypothesis (H0: 𝛽 = 0) that investor sentiment has no predictive ability based on the significance 
of the slope coefficient.   
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Figure 5 and 6 reports the t-statistics of the slope coefficient from the predictive regressions 
across different time horizons (one to 60 months), using the OLS and mARM estimation methods, 
respectively. Summarizing the two graphs, we observe a number of empirical patterns. First, it is 
reassured that (local) investor sentiment is a reliable momentum signal in the short run across the 
three size-sorted portfolios. Second, the short-term momentum effect seems to matter more for 
the small sized firms than for the large ones, as there are more significantly positive t-statistics 
within the first year. Besides, the slope coefficients on the size portfolios monotonically increase 
in magnitude from large-cap to small-cap stocks, while the R
2
 values also rise monotonically 
(untabulated). Third, while market sentiment serves as a contrarian predictor in the long run, the 
negative impact gets weaker from large-cap to small-cap stocks. In other words, the strong 
positive time-series predictability is more pronounced and lasts over longer horizons for small-
cap stocks than large-cap ones. Finally, and the most strikingly, we find the t-statistics on the 
slope coefficients for the regression using the zero-cost portfolio returns (as the dependent 
variable) are mostly positive during the 60-month forecasting horizons. That is, high sentiment 
implies a high size premium over future investment horizons. This striking cross-sectional 
difference goes counter to the existing findings of contrarian predictability regarding the 
sentiment effect from the developed markets. The bottom line, however, is that we confirm that 
sentiment is a size story. That is, it reinforces our conjecture that the momentum signal extracted 
from market sentiment is more pronounced for small firms than for large firms in China. 
Considering the strong short-sales constraints in China, it seems reasonable to argue that small 
firms are subject more to irrational sentimental beliefs and it is more difficult to arbitrage away 
sentiment-induced mispricing, compared with their large-cap counterparts.  
Overall, we can conclude that the sentiment impact is stronger for small-sized stocks than for 
large-sized stocks, indicating that the price of small stocks exhibits possibly stronger run-up 
induced by retail investors over relatively long investment horizons.  
5.2. Cross-sectional Effect of Global Sentiment 
Following the cross-sectional analysis in the prior subsection, we check whether the impact of the 
global sentiment might also differ in the cross section. We adopt the same predictive regression 
framework with both local and global sentiment as in Equation [4.10], except that the dependent 
variables are now replaced by the monthly excess return series of the three size-sorted portfolios 
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and the return of a zero-cost portfolio, in which we go long the small-cap and short the big-cap 
stocks. The sample period is restricted to July 1997 to December 2010 due to the limits of the 
data on global sentiment.  
Figures 7 and 8 visualize the t-statistics of the slope coefficient on global sentiment, using the 
OLS and mARM estimation methods, respectively. Based on the two graphs, a number of 
empirical patterns can be summarized. First, comparing the plots on the three size-sorted 
portfolios, we find again that global sentiment does not have an immediate impact, but influence 
stock returns negatively in the long run across all the size groups. In particular, the long-run 
contrarian predictability is concentrated between three- and four-year horizons, confirming global 
sentiment spillover to the local markets as documented in (Baker et al. 2012). 
Second, we evaluate whether there are any cross-sectional differences by checking the impact of 
the global sentiment on the zero-cost portfolio, in which we go long the small-cap stocks and 
short the large-cap ones. We find some (weak) evidence that global sentiment acts as a warning 
sign for the size premium in the long run as the t-statistics are mostly negative from the 13th 
month onwards. However, none of the t-statistics are significant at the conventional 5% level.  
Overall, our finding reinforced the role of global sentiment, which spreads across markets and 
predicts negatively stock returns in the cross section. 
 
6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks  
This paper contributes to the growing literature on investor sentiment in financial markets. Our 
focus on the Chinese A-share market offers complementary evidence of sentiment effects from an 
emerging market perspective, for example, the dominant presence of retail investors, stringent 
short-sales constraints, heavy capital controls and less openness to the international investors. All 
of these features of an emerging market provide an important piece of “out-of-sample” evidence 
to gauge the forecasting power of investor sentiment at the market level and in the cross section.  
In contrast to the prevailing view that (local) investor sentiment is a contrarian predictor of 
market returns at nearly all horizons, we find compelling evidence that (local) investor sentiment 
in China is a reliable momentum signal at the monthly frequency: A one-standard-deviation 
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increase in sentiment translates into a (bias-adjusted) 1.50% rise in market excess returns per 
month, an economically significant result for all market participants. More strikingly, we 
document an interesting pattern that investor sentiment shifts from a momentum predictor in the 
short term (mainly within one year) to a long-run contrarian predictor in subsequent periods. 
Cross-sectional evidence reveals two things. First, it reinforces the conventional view that 
investor sentiment is more of a small-firm effect. Second, it suggests that the strong positive 
time-series predictability is more pronounced and lasts over longer horizons for small-cap stocks 
than large cap ones. In comparison, the impact of global sentiment is less immediate, but does 
predict returns negatively over longer horizons and in the cross section, confirming that the 
sentiment spills over from the global market.  
The dramatic shift of investor sentiment from a short-term momentum predictor to a long-run 
warning sign implies two things. First, on average, (local) investor sentiment gets the future 
market direction correct over the short investor horizon. Second, despite the fact that systematic 
biased beliefs of uninformed investors can persist for an unexpectedly long period of time, it 
eventually leads to subsequent price reversals shown by the long-run contrarian predictability. 
From a broad perspective, the documented term structure of the sentiment effect and its 
associated pricing impact can help address a number of seemingly anomalous phenomena in 
China. One such example is the long-lasting price discrepancies between A-shares and B-shares 
in China (Mei et al. 2009), or the same Chinese firm being crossed-listed in the Chinese A-share 
markets and in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange or in NYSE/Nasdaq in the US (Chan et al. 2008). 
Another example is the IPO frenzy in China’s primary market and its associated extreme IPO 
underpricing in the secondary market (Tian 2011). Therefore, the policy implication of our study 
is to further improve the short-selling mechanisms in China not only for large-cap stocks, but, 
more importantly, for small-cap stocks.  
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Figure 1. Market Excess Returns and Investor Sentiment of the Entire Sample: 1997–2013 
 
The solid line (the left y-axis) depicts the standardized investor sentiment index obtained from the principal component analysis, the PCA sentiment index. The 
solid bar (the right y-axis) depicts the (monthly) market excess return (in deciles) over the risk-free rate. The plot covers the entire sample period from July 1997 
to December 2013.    
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Figure 2. Multi-horizon Predictability Pattern under Alternative Estimation Methods. 
 
The figure depicts the t-statistics of the slope coefficients in the multi-horizon predictive regression under alternative estimation methods. Panel A to D represent 
the OLS, mARM, uARM, and MBJK methods, respectively. We regress the monthly excess return of the total market on the lagged sentiment index over various 
horizons. The horizons (month lags) vary from one month to 60 months. The plot is obtained from the entire sample period from July 1997 to December 2013. 
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Figure 3. Local and Global Investor Sentiment during the Sample Period: 1997–2010 
The red line depicts the local investor sentiment, proxied by the PCA sentiment index, while the blue line depicts the global sentiment, proxied by the US 
sentiment index by Baker and Wurgler (2006). Both time-series are re-standardized to have mean zero and unit variance during the common period from July 
1997 to December 2010.   
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Figure 4. Multi-horizon Predictability Patterns of the Local and Global Sentiment, OLS and mARM method 
 
The figure depicts the t-statistics of the slope coefficients on the local and global sentiment indices, respectively. We use both OLS and mARM methods in the 
multi-horizon predictive regression. The horizons (month lags) vary from one month up to 60 months. The plot is obtained from the entire sample period from 
July 1997 to December 2013. 
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Figure 5. Multi-horizon Predictability Patterns in the Cross Section, OLS Method 
 
The figure depicts the t-statistics of the slope coefficient on the sentiment index in the multi-horizon predictive regression using the OLS method. We regress the 
monthly excess return of the big-cap, medium-cap, small-cap, and small-minus-big portfolio on the lagged sentiment index over various horizons. The horizons 
(month lags) vary from one month up to 60 months. The plot is obtained from the entire sample period from July 1997 to December 2013.   
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Figure 6. Multi-horizon Predictability Patterns in the Cross Section, mARM method 
 
The figure depicts the t-statistics of the slope coefficient on the sentiment index in the multi-horizon predictive regression using the mARM method. We regress 
the monthly excess return of the big-cap, medium-cap, small-cap, and small-minus-big portfolio on the lagged sentiment index over various horizons. The 
horizons (month lags) vary from one month up to 60 months. The plot is obtained from the entire sample period from July 1997 to December 2013.   
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Figure 7. Multi-horizon Predictability Patterns of the Global Sentiment for the Size-sorted Portfolios, OLS method 
 
The figure depicts the t-statistics of the slope coefficients on the global sentiment index in the multi-horizon predictive regression using the OLS method. We 
regress the monthly excess return of the big-cap, medium-cap, small-cap, and small-minus-big portfolio on the lagged local and global sentiment indexes over 
various horizons. The horizons (month lags) vary from one month up to 60 months. The plot is obtained from the entire sample period from July 1997 to 
December 2013.  
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Figure 8. Multi-horizon Predictability Patterns of the Global Sentiment for the Size-sorted Portfolios, mARM method 
 
The figure depicts the t-statistics of the slope coefficients on the global sentiment index in the multi-horizon predictive regression using the mARM method. We 
regress the monthly excess return of the big-cap, medium-cap, small-cap, and small-minus-big portfolio on the lagged local and global sentiment indexes over 
various horizons. The horizons (month lags) vary from one month up to 60 months. The plot is obtained from the entire sample period from July 1997 to 
December 2013.  
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Table 1: Data and Data Sources 
Variables  Sources 
Market capitalization (MV), Monthly return (Ret), Daily turnover 
(Turn), One-year time deposit rate (RF),  
Thomson Reuters Datastream  
Business cycle indicator (BCI), Industrial production (IP), Number of 
new opened individual investor accounts in Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(IIA), Money supply (M2), 30-day National interbank offer rate (IR), 
Exchange rate (CNY/USD), Consumer confidence index (CCI)   
CEIC database 
Market-wide PE ratio (PE) CICC database 
US sentiment index Baker and Wurgler (2007) 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
In this table, we present the summary statistics for the monthly excess return of the market portfolio ( 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 ), 
sentiment index constructed by principal component analysis (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴), the three composite sentiment proxies (all 
orthogonalized to macro effects): Turnover ratio (𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡
𝑂 ), the number of newly opened investor accounts in 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (𝐼𝐼𝐴𝑡
𝑂), and the value-weighted PE ratio (𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝑂). The business cycle indicator (𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡), the 
growth of the industrial production (𝐼𝑃𝑡), and the market-wide PE ratio (𝑃𝐸𝑡). The upper part of the table reports the 
arithmetic mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, minimum, maximum, 25% and 75% quantile points, 
and first order autocorrelation coefficient, while the lower part the cross-correlation coefficients. The sample period 
is from July 1997 to December 2013. 
 
Obs. Mean Median St.Dev. Min Max Skew Kurt 25% 75% Rho 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 (%) 198 0.16 0.24 8.07 -28.11 29.03 -0.18 4.39 -5.19 4.91 0.04 
𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 198 0.00 -0.18 1 -1.85 3.75 1.06 4.58 -0.65 0.55 0.70 
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡
𝑂 198 0.00 -0.15 1 -2.77 3.19 0.77 4.37 -0.68 0.56 0.56 
𝐼𝐼𝐴𝑡
𝑂  198 0.00 -0.13 1 -2.94 3.35 0.91 4.78 -0.63 0.46 0.63 
𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝑂  198 0.00 0.01 1 -3.12 2.55 -0.35 3.93 -0.51 0.59 0.83 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑡 198 0.00 0.26 1 -2.39 1.45 -0.52 2.23 -0.81 0.79 0.92 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡  198 0.00 0.15 1 -2.42 1.76 -0.44 2.52 -0.61 0.74 0.97 
𝐼𝑃𝑡  198 0.00 -0.03 1 -2.89 2.66 -0.10 2.69 -0.81 0.80 0.58 
𝑃𝐸𝑡  198 0.00 0.12 1 -1.93 1.69 -0.28 1.85 -0.94 0.81 0.98 
            
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡
𝑂 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝑡
𝑂  𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝑂  𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑡 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡  𝐼𝑃𝑡  𝑃𝐸𝑡   
 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 1 0.55 0.43 0.35 0.59 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.14 
  𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 0.55 1 0.80 0.90 0.72 -0.10 -0.12 -0.01 0.07 
  𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡
𝑂 0.43 0.80 1 0.63 0.29 -0.15 -0.12 -0.03 -0.17 
  𝐼𝐼𝐴𝑡
𝑂  0.35 0.90 0.63 1 0.52 -0.04 -0.09 0.00 0.09 
  𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝑂  0.59 0.72 0.29 0.52 1 -0.07 -0.08 0.02 0.26 
  𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑡 0.02 -0.10 -0.15 -0.04 -0.07 1 0.16 0.28 0.66 
  𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡  -0.05 -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.08 0.16 1 0.67 -0.09 
  𝐼𝑃𝑡  -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.28 0.67 1 0.09 
  𝑃𝐸𝑡  0.14 0.07 -0.17 0.09 0.26 0.66 -0.09 0.09 1 
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Table 3. Single-factor Predictive Regression 
The table reports the estimation results of the predictive regression with single regressor. Panel A considers the PCA 
sentiment index for the entire sample period and two subsample periods. Panel B considers the three individual 
sentiment composites (all orthogonalized to macro effects): Turnover ratio (𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡
𝑂), the number of newly opened 
investor accounts in Shanghai Stock Exchange (𝐼𝐼𝐴𝑡
𝑂), and the value-weighted PE ratio (𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝑂). Panel C considers 
three alternative sentiment indexes. The first one is the equal-weighted naïve sentiment index (denoted as 𝑆𝑡
𝑁𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒), 
the second is the PCA sentiment index excluding 𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝑂  as a component (denoted as 𝑆𝑡
𝐸𝑥𝑃𝐸), and the third one uses 
consumer confidence index ( 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑡 ), a survey-based index. For each predictor variable, we report the slope 
coefficients obtained from both the OLS method (first line) and the mARM method (second line). *, **, and *** 
stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on Newey-West t-statistics. 
 Beta t-stat p-value Empirical p-value R
2
 
 Panel A: PCA sentiment index, entire sample 
OLS 0.0138** 2.55 0.0115 0.0150 2.95% 
mARM 0.0150*** 3.32 0.0011 0.0135 38.98% 
 Subsample 1: July 1997–December 2005 
OLS 0.0089** 2.42 0.0174 0.0375 1.73% 
mARM 0.0112*** 3.25 0.0016 0.0980 47.52% 
 Subsample 2: January 2006–December 2013 
OLS 0.0169* 1.90 0.0608 0.0480 3.44% 
mARM 0.0194** 2.52 0.0133 0.0320 34.57% 
 Panel B: Individual composites of sentiment index, entire sample 
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡
𝑂      
OLS 0.0085** 2.18 0.0303 0.0295 1.10% 
mARM 0.0091** 2.39 0.0178 0.0790 20.59% 
𝐼𝐼𝐴𝑡
𝑂       
OLS 0.0105 1.61 0.1100 0.0800 1.70% 
mARM 0.0111* 1.87 0.0636 0.0480 13.99% 
𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝑂       
OLS 0.0154*** 3.15 0.0019 0.0050 3.64% 
mARM 0.0177*** 5.69 0.0000 0.0065 64.40% 
 Panel C: Alternative sentiment index, entire sample 
𝑆𝑡
𝑁𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒      
OLS 0.0141*** 2.63 0.0092 0.0170 2.59% 
mARM 0.0153*** 3.55 0.0005 0.0125 41.15% 
𝑆𝑡
𝐸𝑥𝑃𝐸      
OLS 0.0105** 2.19 0.0295 0.0340 1.70% 
mARM 0.0112** 2.42 0.0165 0.0525 21.54% 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑡   
 
  
OLS -0.0003 -0.05 0.9615 0.9900 0.00% 
mARM 0.0003 0.04 0.9651 0.8900 0.35% 
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Table 4. Multiple-factor Predictive Regression 
The table reports the output of the multi-variate predictive regressions under alternative model specifications. 
Specification 1 to 3 are bivariate predictive regressions which estimate the sentiment effect while controlling for the 
effect of business cycle (𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡), the growth of the industrial production (𝐼𝑃𝑡), and the market-wide PE ratio (𝑃𝐸𝑡). 
Specification 4 is the kitchen sink model which includes all the three control variables simultaneously. For brevity, 
we report only the slope coefficients estimated from the mARM method. *, **, and *** stand for significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, based on Newey-West t-statistics. 
mARM Beta t-stat p-value Empirical p-value R
2
 
Specification 1       
𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 0.0144*** 3.67 0.0003 0.0115 40.11% 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡  0.0000 0.01 0.9883 0.4890  
Specification 2 
     
𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 0.0152*** 3.23 0.0015 0.0115 40.80% 
𝐼𝑃𝑡  0.0006 0.16 0.8763 0.4875  
Specification 3 
     
𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 0.0134*** 4.30 0.0000 0.0235 76.49% 
𝑃𝐸𝑡  0.0041** 2.12 0.0349 0.0310  
Specification 4 
     
𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 0.0139*** 4.95 0.0000 0.0230 77.16% 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡  -0.0018 -1.06 0.2922 0.8180  
𝐼𝑃𝑡  -0.0057* -1.80 0.0736 0.3565  
𝑃𝐸𝑡  0.0099*** 3.01 0.0030 0.1385  
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Table 5. Out-of-sample Forecast Performance 
The table reports the out-of-sample performance of various predictors in predicting subsequent market returns. The 
out-of-sample forecasts are formed using fitted valued of the slope coefficients from OLS, mARM, uARM, and 
MBJK estimation methods, respectively. Panel A considers the case of univariate predictive regression with either 
the PCA sentiment index or the naïve (equal-weighted) sentiment index as the predicting variable. Panel B considers 
the bivariate case with the PCA sentiment as one of the predictors, and another control variable as Business cycle 
indicator (𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 ), growth of industrial production (𝐼𝑃𝑡 ), and PE ratio (𝑃𝐸𝑡 ), respectively. All of the sentiment 
variables and model parameters are estimated recursively based on information prior to the forecast period. 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  is 
the Campbell and Thompson (2008) out-of-sample R
2
, MSFE is the mean squared forecast error, DM-test is the 
Diebold and Mariano (1995) test statistic, and CW-test is the Clark and West (2007) MSFE-adjusted statistic. *, **, 
and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The out-of-sample period ranges from January 2007 to 
December 2013.   
Method (Variables) MSFE 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  DM-test CW-test 
Panel A: Univariate Predictive Regression 
OLS (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 0.00849 3.45% 0.79 1.33* 
mARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 0.00845 3.89% 0,79 1.39* 
uARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 0.00846 3.82% 0,79 1.38* 
MBJK (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 0.00851 3.25% 0,70 1.29* 
     
OLS (𝑆𝑡
𝑁𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒) 0.00848 3.54% 0.78 1.35* 
mARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑁𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒) 0.00845 3.96% 0.78 1.41* 
uARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑁𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒) 0.00845 3.90% 0.78 1.40* 
MBJK (𝑆𝑡
𝑁𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒) 0.00850 3.34% 0.70 1.31* 
Panel B: Bivariate Predictive Regression 
OLS (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴, 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡) 0.00850 3.40% 0.77 1.39* 
mARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴, 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡) 0.00863 1.84% 0.37 1.23 
uARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴, 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡) 0.00860 2.25% 0.50 1.11 
MBJK (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴, 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡) 0.00855 2.83% 0.60 1.28* 
     
OLS (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴, 𝐼𝑃𝑡) 0.00856 2.67% 0.62 1.21 
mARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴, 𝐼𝑃𝑡) 0.00852 3.12% 0.64 1.29* 
mARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴, 𝐼𝑃𝑡) 0.00862 1.99% 0.42 1.08 
MBJK (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴, 𝐼𝑃𝑡) 0.00856 2.69% 0.57 1.22 
     
OLS (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴, 𝑃𝐸𝑡) 0.00868 1.28% 0.27 0.97 
mARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴, 𝑃𝐸𝑡) 0.00856 2.63% 0.51 1.37* 
mARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴, 𝑃𝐸𝑡) 0.00863 1.84% 0.60 1.06 
MBJK (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴, 𝑃𝐸𝑡) 0.00868 1.34% 0.29 0.93 
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Table 6. Trading Strategies 
Panel A and B reports the annualized mean returns and Sharpe ratios, respectively, for the buy-and-hold strategy 
(denoted as B&H) and the long-only market timing strategy using different buy signals. 𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 denotes the timing 
strategy based on the buy signal when the lagged sentiment is above zero. OLS (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴), mARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴), mARM 
(𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 ), and MBJK (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 ) denote the buy signals when the predicted excess return generated by the different 
estimation techniques (OLS, mARM, uARM, and MBJK) are above zero, respectively. TSMOM denotes the long-
only time-series momentum strategy with the buy signal when the lagged twelve-month return (excluding the most 
recent month) exceeds zero. Panel C reports the Fama-French four-factor model regression results for the time-series 
momentum strategy and the timing strategy using the buy signal when the lagged sentiment is above zero. The out-
of-sample evaluation period is from January 2007 to December 2013. *, **, and *** stand for significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Panel A: Annualized Mean Return (%) 
Holding period = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
B&H -1.40 - - - - - - - - - - - 
𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 10.75 12.59 13.30 12.84 11.13 10.27 10.04 9.54 7.69 6.88 6.34 5.04 
OLS (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 4.75 7.92 8.13 9.25 6.81 6.27 6.40 5.48 3.59 2.63 2.57 1.30 
mARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 5.95 10.81 10.24 10.70 8.57 7.68 7.72 6.79 5.21 4.01 3.78 2.31 
uARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 5.95 10.81 10.24 10.70 8.57 7.68 7.72 6.79 5.21 4.01 3.78 2.31 
MBJK (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 4.75 7.92 8.13 9.25 6.81 6.27 6.40 5.48 3.59 2.63 2.57 1.30 
TSMOM 0.11 3.12 1.00 -0.29 -0.70 -0.98 -2.02 -2.54 -2.85 -2.82 -2.90 -2.84 
Panel B: Annualized Sharpe Ratio 
Holding period = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
B&H -0.04 - - - - - - - - - - - 
𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 0.52 0.64 0.67 0.65 0.56 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.27 
OLS (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 0.21 0.37 0.37 0.44 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.06 
mARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 0.26 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.41 0.37 0.38 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.19 0.11 
uARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 0.26 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.41 0.37 0.38 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.19 0.11 
MBJK (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 0.21 0.37 0.37 0.44 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.06 
TSMOM 0.00 0.14 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 
Panel C: Fama-French 4-factor Regression 
 
Intercept RMRF SMB HML WML 𝑎𝑑𝑗. 𝑅2 
𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 0.85** 0.47*** -0.09 0.24* -0.19 0.65 
t-stat  2.21 5.00 -1.01 1.91 -1.49 
 TSMOM 0.40 0.54*** -0.11 0.35*** 0.38*** 0.63 
t-stat 1.04 3.69 -0.77 2.83 2.71 
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Appendix A: Predictive Regression, Estimation Bias, and Monte Carlo Simulation  
Accessing the return predictability of one economic variable is not only an economic issue but 
also an econometric one. Even for a univariate predictive regression, the standard OLS method 
produces biased coefficients (the well-known Stambaugh (1999) small-sample bias), when the 
regressor is persistent and its innovations are correlated with those of the dependent variable. To 
illustrate this point, we follow the general setup in the econometrics literature by considering the 
following (single-regressor) predictive regression model.  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 [A.1] 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝜃 + 𝜌𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡 [A.2] 
where 𝑦𝑡 is the stock or portfolio returns (in excess of risk-free rate) at period t, 𝑥𝑡−1 is the lagged 
predictor variable which follows an AR(1) process as specified in Eq. [A.2], and the innovation 
terms (𝑢𝑡, 𝑣𝑡) follow a joint normal distribution with zero mean and a covariance matrix  
(
𝜎𝑢
2 𝜎𝑢𝑣
𝜎𝑢𝑣 𝜎𝑣
2 ). 
[A.3] 
The relationship between 𝑢𝑡 and 𝑣𝑡 can also be expressed in the following equation.  
𝑢𝑡 = 𝜉𝑣𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 [A.4] 
where 𝜉 = 𝜎𝑢𝑣 𝜎𝑣
2⁄  and 𝑒𝑡 is the i.id. error term.  
Given the above setup, Stambaugh (1999) provides an analytical expression for the bias of the 
OLS estimator, ?̂?, which is exact for any given sample size T. (The bias in ?̂? depends on both 𝜉 
and the estimation bias in the autoregressive estimator, ?̂?.)   
Ε(?̂?) − 𝛽 = 𝜉[Ε(?̂?) − 𝜌] [A.5] 
Building on the work of Marriott and Pope (1954) on the bias in the estimation of the 
autocorrelation, Stambaugh (1999) further provides an approximation for the bias in ?̂?.  
Ε(?̂?) − 𝛽 = −𝜉
(1 + 3𝜌)
𝑇
+ O (
1
𝑇2
) 
[A.6] 
As it stands, the magnitude of the bias is proportional to 𝜉  and the (true) autoregressive 
coefficient, 𝜌, but is inversely proportional to sample size T.   
One caveat to be noted is that unlike many other predictive variables (such as dividend yields), 
the innovations of sentiment have a positive correlation with those of stock returns, that is, a 
positive 𝜉 in the case of stock return and investor sentiment in Eq. [A.4]. Given that the (true) 
autocorrelation coefficient 𝜌 is bounded in (0, 1) for a stationary autoregressive process, the ?̂? 
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coefficient in Eq. [A.1] is bound to be downward biased (meaning that the OLS estimator is 
smaller than the true parameter, see Eq. [A.6]). The downward bias is more pronounced when the 
sample size is small. To sum up, empirical studies tend to be biased towards the finding of 
contrarian predictability of sentiment at short-horizons (weekly or monthly frequency), even if 
there exists no return predictability at all (or very small positive return predictability). To 
illustrate this point, we carried out simulations to provide additional insights on the potential 
adverse impact on the small-sample bias problem. Of course, the small-sample bias has made 
itself a hot topic in the econometric literature, as multiple bias-reduction techniques have been 
proposed in the literature (Amihud & Hurvich 2004; Amihud et al. 2009; Chiquoine & 
Hjalmarsson 2009; Zhu 2013).  
We provide below two simulation cases whose parameters are designed to mirror our sample 
statistics. Estimation results of the standard OLS method and several bias-reduction techniques, 
including the univariate Augmented Regression Method (uARM) as in Amihud and Hurvich 
(2004), the multivariate Augmented Regression Method (mARM) of Amihud et al. (2009) and 
the Moving-block Jackknife (MBJK) method by Zhu (2013), are presented for comparison 
purpose.  
We simulate stock market returns and investor sentiment data using Eq. [A.1] and [A.2], where 
the parameters 𝛼  and 𝜃  are set as zero, the autoregressive root 𝜌  is set as 0.6597, and the 
innovation terms (𝑢𝑡 , 𝑣𝑡) follow a joint normal distribution with zero mean and a covariance 
matrix (
0.0066 0.0372
0.0372 0.5883
) . The sample size is fixed at 202. These parameter values follow 
closely our sample characteristics. To illustrate the adverse impact due to finite-sample bias, we 
set the 𝛽 coefficient equal to 0 and 0.01 in case 1 and 2, respectively. Table A.1 presents the 
simulation results. 
As is demonstrated by the simulation evidence in Table A.1, the slope coefficient of the 
predictive regression using the OLS method is downward biased in both simulation cases. Even if 
there is no real return predictability (as in case 1), the OLS method tends to find negative slope 
values, which might lead scholars to (erroneously) conclude that investor sentiment is a 
contrarian predictors at short horizons (e.g. weekly or monthly frequency). Even if sentiment is a 
momentum predictor (as in case 2), its economic relevance tends to be smaller as evaluated by 
the OLS method due to the downward bias. In case 2, it seems that the OLS bias in the slope 
coefficient amounts to 10% of the true parameter, which is not negligible in real applications. 
Table A.1 also offers a small-scale horserace on the competing method of bias reduction. In both 
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cases, the mARM method tends to provide the best estimation results, as its bias is the smallest, 
while the variation of the slope coefficient is also among the smallest. The uARM method 
performs slightly worse than mARM in case 1, as it leads to larger bias in absolute terms. 
Although the MBJK method reduces the estimation bias quite satisfactorily, it produces larger 
estimation uncertainty as indicated by its inflated standard errors, which is also admitted in Zhu 
(2013). Overall, our simulation evidence favors the use of the mARM method in our empirical 
application of the article. 
 
Appendix B: Portfolio Implications: Asset Allocation Strategy 
Here we offer additional insights by using the conventional asset allocation strategy for a mean-
variance investor (DeMiguel et al. 2009): The mean-variance investor dynamically allocates 
between the risky asset (market portfolio) and risk-free asset based on the one-period-ahead 
expected (excess) return generated by Eq. [4.4]. At the end of period t, the investor allocates 𝑤𝑡 
of the portfolio to the market portfolio and the remaining (1 − 𝑤𝑡) of the portfolio to the risk-free 
asset. The equity proportion 𝑤𝑡 depends on two factors. First, it is the (expected) market price of 
risk, calculated as the ratio of forecasted excess return of the market portfolio (𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1)) to its 
associated variance (𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1)). The expected variance is measured with the five-year rolling 
window of monthly excess returns. Second, it is inversely related to the risk aversion coefficient, 
𝛾. The equity proportion is expressed in the following equation.  
𝑤𝑡 = (
1
𝛾
) (
𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1)
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1)
) [A.7] 
For realistic concerns, we place two boundary constraints on the portfolio weight on equities: The 
value of 𝑤𝑡  cannot be negative and its maximum is set at 1.5. These boundary restrictions 
correspond to the short-sales constraint and the leverage constraint, respectively. Both well 
reflect the real-world conditions in China’s stock market. The realized excess return of the 
portfolio 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑃  at period 𝑡 + 1 is then calculated as   
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑃 = 𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑡+1 [A.8] 
To evaluate the portfolio performance, we calculate the (out-of-sample) Sharpe ratio and the 
certainty equivalent return (CEQ), respectively.  
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𝑆?̂?𝑃 =
?̂?𝑃
?̂?𝑃
 [A.9] 
𝐶𝐸?̂?𝑃 = ?̂?𝑃 −
𝛾
2
?̂?𝑃
2 [A.10] 
where ?̂?𝑃 and ?̂?𝑃 denotes the mean and standard deviation of the portfolio excess returns, and 𝛾 is 
the risk-aversion coefficient. 
To gauge the economic value of the out-of-sample predictability enhanced by investor sentiment, 
we then compute the Sharpe ratio difference and the CEQ gain between an investor who adopts 
the portfolio strategy based on predictive regression in Eq. [4.4] and another investor who uses 
the benchmark portfolio strategy with the historical average only. To assess the statistical 
significance of the Sharpe ratio difference, we perform the test of Jobson and Korkie (1981) 
corrected by Memmel (2003) (JKM-test hereafter). The null hypothesis of the JKM-test is that 
the Sharpe ratio difference of two competing strategies is indistinguishable from zero. Similarly, 
we evaluate the significance of the CEQ gain by performing the test outlined in DeMiguel et al. 
(2009) (DGU-test hereafter). The null hypothesis of the DGU-test is that the CEQ gain is 
indistinguishable from zero between two competing strategies.  
Table A.3 reports the asset allocation results based on the dynamic portfolio allocation strategy. 
Recall (from Section 3.3) that the (implied) risk aversion coefficient (𝛾) of an average investor in 
China is only around 0.25 given the speculative nature of the market. Therefore, we consider 
three ad-hoc scenarios in which 𝛾 equals 0.25, 0.5, and 1, respectively.1 These ad-hoc values of 𝛾 
more or less correspond to an investor who has average, above-average, and extreme risk 
aversion in China (putting 100%, 50%, and 25% of his or her wealth in the risky portfolio). Panel 
A of the table shows that the PCA sentiment index generates large economic gains for a mean-
variance investor, which is consistent with the findings in Table 5. The CEQ gains range between 
1.46% and 1.61% under the alternative estimation techniques, which are all statistically 
significant at the 10% or better levels in the baseline case. The Sharpe ratio of the testing 
portfolio is also significantly larger than that of the benchmark portfolio (which uses only 
                                                 
1
 We noted that the larger the value of the risk-aversion coefficient, the more frequent the investor tilts the portfolio 
towards the risk-free asset. In extreme cases, the investor keeps holding the risk-free asset for prolonged period of 
time, which makes the portfolio allocation strategy less meaningful. This is exactly the reason why we present the 
baseline case of  𝛾 = 0.25, in which the agent has normal risk-aversion and is willing to hold the entire risky asset 
(after all, the market portfolio is held by the total economy). We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to our 
attention.  
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historical average as its return forecast) at the 10% or even finer significance level. The CEQ 
gains range between 0.92% and 1.36% at the 10% significance level when the risk aversion 
coefficient is 0.50. As the investor gets extremely risk averse (𝛾=1.0) by penalizing more on the 
return variability, the CEQ gains get smaller in magnitude. However, the Sharpe ratio remains 
significant and large in magnitude under all three scenarios. Specifically, the Sharpe ratio 
difference between the portfolio strategy based on return predictions from Eq. [4.4] and the 
benchmark portfolio strategy using only the historical average is statistically significant at the 10% 
or finer levels, irrespective the value of the risk-averse coefficient. We find very similar patterns 
of the portfolio allocation results based on the naïve sentiment index in Panel B of the table. Both 
the magnitude and statistical significance of the CEQ gains and Sharpe ratios are very similar for 
the two sentiment indices. Panels C, D, and E present the asset allocation results based on the 
signals generated by the single-factor predictor model using BCI, IP, and PE respectively. We do 
find some evidence that BCI also delivers enhanced asset allocation results compared with the 
benchmark strategy with historical average. But, in general, these fundamentals offer less 
forecasting power as compared with sentiment indices.  
Summarizing the table, we find consistent evidence that the improved forecasting ability with 
investor sentiment translates into economically relevant gains for an investor who uses predictive 
regressions, with or without bias-reduction techniques, to time the market. We also check the 
asset allocation implications based on forecasts generated by multivariate predictive regressions 
(which includes sentiment and other economic variables) to explore a larger set of price-related 
information. The forecast results are in general slightly better than the univariate case 
(untabulated).  
 
Appendix C: Robustness Checks on the Long-term Return Predictability 
For robustness purposes, we consider an alternative model specification for the multi-horizon 
predictive regression. 
𝑅𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑆𝑡) + 𝜓
′𝑍𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡+ℎ  [A.11] 
where 𝑅𝑡+ℎ is the market excess return in the period 𝑡 + ℎ, 𝑆𝑡 is the ℎ-period lagged predictor 
(sentiment proxy) measured at the end of period 𝑡, 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑆𝑡) is the sign of the sentiment proxy, 
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which equals 1 when it is positive, and -1 otherwise. We also include a vector of conventional 
macro variables to control for the shifts in fundamentals. The additional control variables are 
business cycle indicator (BCI), industrial production (IP), and aggregated PE ratio (PE) similar to 
subsection 4.1.2. Again, we test the null hypothesis (H0: 𝛽 = 0) that investor sentiment has no 
predictive ability by evaluating the slope coefficient.  
Figure A.2 plots the term structure of the return predictability under the alternative model 
specification. We find the term structure of the return predictability is very similar to that using 
the investor sentiment index directly as the predicting variable. Within the first year, sentiment 
serves mostly as a momentum signal, while over longer horizons it becomes a contrarian 
predictor. Overall, the similar pattern reinforces the robustness of our findings in the main text.  
 
 
 
Table A.1. Finite-sample Performance in Univariate Regressions 
The table reports the estimated slope coefficient (𝛽) in Eq. [A.1], denoted as Coef. and its standard error, denoted as 
S.E., using the simulated standard deviations based on 1500 realizations for two simulation cases. The estimation 
methods are ordinary least square method (OLS), the multivariate Augmented Regression Method (mARM), the 
univariate Augmented Regression Method (uARM), and the Moving-block Jackknife method (MBJK) with the 
length of the moving-block subsamples set as 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7 (of the total sample length) respectively.  
In both cases, stock market returns and investor sentiment data are simulated with Eq. [A.1] and [A.2], where 
𝛼 = 𝜃 = 0, 𝜌 = 0.6597, and the innovation terms (𝑢𝑡, 𝑣𝑡) follow a bivariate normal distribution with mean zero and 
a covariance matrix (
0.0066 0.0372
0.0372 0.5883
). The sample size is fixed at 202. The 𝛽 coefficient equals to 0 and 0.01 in 
case 1 and 2, respectively. For each case, 1500 replications are performed. 
 Case 1: 𝛽 = 0 Case 2: 𝛽 = 0.01 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
OLS -0.0012 0.0056 0.0091 0.0057 
mARM -0.0002 0.0056 0.0100 0.0057 
uARM -0.0003 0.0056 0.0100 0.0057 
MBJK_3 -0.0003 0.0058 0.0101 0.0059 
MBJK_5 -0.0004 0.0065 0.0101 0.0066 
MBJK_7 -0.0005 0.0086 0.0102 0.0084 
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Table A.2. Statistics of Stock Exchanges 
Panel A: Ranking of the major stock exchanges by the total value of market capitalization as of 31/12/2013 
    # of Stocks (1). Market Capitalization (2). Trading Volume 
(2)/(1) 
  Exchange Name Local Foreign (in USD million) (in USD million) 
1 NYSE 1852 519 17,949,883.80 13,700,450.50 76.33% 
2 NASDAQ 2328 309 6,084,969.70 9,584,742.20 157.52% 
3 Japan Exchange Group  3408 11 4,543,169.10 6,304,927.50 138.78% 
4 London Stock Exchange 2164 572 4,428,975.30 3,050,891.50 68.88% 
5 Euronext  
935 127 3,583,899.70 1,661,878.30 46.37% 
  (Amsterdam, Brussel, Lisbon, Paris) 
6 HongKong Stock Exchange 1553 90 3,100,777.20 1,323,373.30 42.68% 
7 Shanghai Stock Exchange 953 0 2,496,989.90 3,731,128.90 149.43% 
8 TMX Group – Canada 3810 76 2,113,821.80 1,371,477.70 64.88% 
9 Deutsche Börse 639 81 1,936,106.30 1,334,544.90 68.93% 
10 SIX Swiss Exchange 236 36 1,540,699.80 676,957.70 43.94% 
11 Shenzhen Stock Exchange 1536 0 1,452,153.60 3,858,509.00 265.71% 
12 Australian Securities Exchange 1951 104 1,365,958.10 881,555.60 64.54% 
Panel B: Breakdown of the ownership structure and total trading volume for the Shanghai Stock Exchange as of 31/12/2013 
    Market Capitalization Trading Volume  
 Individual Investors   21.78% 82.24%  
 Legal Person   63.64% 2.46%  
 Financial Institutions:    14.58% 15.3%  
       - Investment Funds   4.54% 6.18%  
Source: Statistics of the major exchanges are from the yearly reports of the World Federation of Exchanges (http://www.world-exchanges.org); Statistics of the 
breakdown data of Shanghai Stock Exchange are from Annual Fact Book issued by Shanghai Stock Exchange. Note: Trading volume is measured as the dollar 
trading volume of the entire year. Financial Institutions include brokerage and security firms, investment funds (mutual funds), pension funds, asset under 
management, and QFII (qualified foreign institutional investor). Legal Person includes all other companies, corporations, enterprises, departments, juridical 
association and agents.  
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Table A.3. Asset Allocation Results 
This table reports CEQ gains and Sharpe ratio for a mean-variance investor, who dynamically allocates between 
equities and the risk-free asset based on the forecasts from predictable variable(s) instead of historical average. The 
investor is assumed to have a risk aversion coefficient of 0.25, 0.5, and 1, respectively. The portfolio weights (with 
boundary restrictions) are determined recursively by the forecast on equity returns, formed using OLS, mARM, 
uARM, and MBJK estimation methods. We evaluate whether the CEQ gain is significantly larger than zero based on 
asymptotic distributions according to DeMiguel et al. (2009). We also perform the one-sided JKM-test on whether 
the testing portfolio’s Sharpe ratio is significantly larger than that of the benchmark portfolio using historical average. 
*, **, and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The out-of-sample period is from January 2007 to 
December 2013. 
 𝛾 = 0.25 𝛾 = 0.5 𝛾 = 1.0 
Method (Variables) CEQ gain Sharpe ratio CEQ gain  Sharpe ratio CEQ gain Sharpe ratio 
Panel A: PCA sentiment index 
OLS (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 0.0147* 0.08* 0.0118* 0.10* 0.0106* 0.13* 
mARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 0.0161** 0.10** 0.0136* 0.13* 0.0115* 0.14* 
uARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 0.0157** 0.09** 0.0134* 0.12* 0.0114* 0.14* 
MBJK (𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴) 0.0146* 0.08* 0.0092 0.07 0.0089 0.11 
Panel B: Naïve sentiment index 
OLS (𝑆𝑡
𝑁𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒) 0.0149** 0.08** 0.0112* 0.10* 0.0103* 0.12* 
mARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑁𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒) 0.0157** 0.09** 0.0128* 0.12* 0.0112* 0.14* 
uARM (𝑆𝑡
𝑁𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒) 0.0155** 0.09** 0.0126* 0.11* 0.0111* 0.13* 
MBJK (𝑆𝑡
𝑁𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒) 0.0147* 0.08* 0.0094 0.08 0.0085 0.10 
Panel C: BCI 
OLS (𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡) 0.0129** 0.06** 0.0079** 0.06** 0.0043** 0.05*** 
mARM (𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡) 0.0108** 0.04** 0.0057** 0.04** 0.0028 0.04** 
uARM (𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡) 0.0106** 0.04** 0.0054** 0.03** 0.0031 0.04** 
MBJK (𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡) 0.0143*** 0.07** 0.0106*** 0.09*** 0.0066** 0.08*** 
Panel D: IP 
OLS (𝐼𝑃𝑡) -0.0015 -0.08 -0.0026 -0.05 -0.0026 -0.03 
mARM (𝐼𝑃𝑡) -0.0016 -0.08 -0.0025 -0.05 -0.0026 -0.03 
uARM (𝐼𝑃𝑡) -0.0016 -0.08 -0.0025 -0.05 -0.0026 -0.03 
MBJK (𝐼𝑃𝑡) 0.0016 -0.03 0.0000 -0.02 -0.0007 0.00 
Panel E: PE 
OLS (𝑃𝐸𝑡) -0.0025 -0.06 -0.0091 -0.10 -0.0094 -0.14 
mARM (𝑃𝐸𝑡) 0.0134* 0.07** 0.0083* 0.07* 0.0044** 0.05* 
uARM (𝑃𝐸𝑡) 0.0035 -0.03 0.0011 -0.01 0.0007 0.00 
MBJK (𝑃𝐸𝑡) -0.0019 -0.09 -0.0055 -0.12 -0.0050 -0.14 
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Figure. A.1. Time-series Plots of Excess Market Returns, Investor Sentiment, Business Cycle Indicator and Industrial 
Production 
 
The figure includes the bar chart of the (monthly) market excess return (measured in decimals) and the time-series plots of the investor sentiment index obtained 
from the principal component analysis, the business cycle indicator, the growth of industry production, the value-weighted PE ratio, and the consumer confidence 
index. All the economic and financial variables (except the excess returns) are standardized to have mean zero and unit variance. The time-series plot covers the 
entire sample period from July 1997 to December 2013.  
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Figure A.2: Multi-horizon Predictability Pattern under Alternative Model Specification 
 
The figure depicts the t-statistics of the slope coefficients in the multi-horizon predictive regression under alternative model specification: 𝑅𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼 +
𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑆𝑡) + 𝜓
′𝑍𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡+ℎ. Panel A to D represent the OLS, mARM, uARM, and MBJK methods, respectively. We regress the monthly excess return of the total 
market on the sign of the lagged sentiment index over various horizons. The horizons (month lags) vary from one month up to 60 months. The plot is obtained 
from the entire sample period from July 1997 to December 2013. 
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